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Abstract
In our contemporary globalized world, Eritrean enterprises are challenged with high competition
from within and from foreign counterparts. Consequently, only those companies that predict the
future and take proactive decisions can win the game. However, none of these organizations
have applied formal competitive intelligence practice in a proactive, disciplined, and systematic
fashion to defend against threats as well as to exploit opportunities, though informally they do
engage in the practice.
Some of these informal competitive intelligence practicing companies are relatively 'good
performers' and others are 'poor performers'. The level of this competitive intelligence
performance is believed to be influenced by organizational culture. This implies that employees
who are encouraged and trained to have shared values, beliefs, norms and practices are in a
better position to share information and interact with each other with open minds. Here, the free
flow of information is the basic ingredient that helps to produce effective competitive
intelligence.
In an attempt to explore if a statistically significant relationship exists between organizational
culture and competitive intelligence performance, a literature study was first carried out to learn
from other scholars' work. The literature review was then followed by an empirical study. This
empirical part of the study attempted to investigate if Eritrean manufacturers and traders perform
informal competitive intelligence practice as well as if there is a positive relationship between
the independent and dependent variables. Data was collected through a questionnaire from top
level managers. Of the 39 questionnaires distributed, 23 organizations properly completed the
questionnaire. Statistical analysis was then computed using the SPSS package to determine the
correlations.
The relationship between organizational culture and competitive intelligence was determined in
two ways: first, it was correlated in terms of the six selected organizational culture dimensions
(employee involvement, human resources, organizational focus, communication flow, reward,
and trust) and competitive intelligence; and second, in terms of scores of each firm's
organizational culture and competitive intelligence. Moreover, the level of the score determined
whether these companies performed well or not.
In both cases a positive relationship was found between organizational culture and competitive
intelligence performance. These results supported the hypothesis that organizational culture does
contribute to improved competitive intelligence practice. Furthermore, the finding suggests that
Eritrean firms are doing moderately good in their informal competitive intelligence.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
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Opsomming
In ons huidige globaliseerde wêreld kry Eritrea se ondernemings te doen met sterk kompetisie
van binne and van buite die land. Dus floreer net daardie ondermemings wat die toekoms kan
voorspel en pro-aktiewe besluite kan neem. Dit is egter waar dat nie een van hierdie
organisasies formele, kompeterende intelligensiepraktyke op 'n pro-aktiewe, gedisiplineerde
en sistematiese wyse toegepas het om hulself teen dreigemente te beskerm en om geleenthede
uit te buit nie; informeel het hulle wel.
Sommige van hierdie maatskappye wat informeel kompeterende intelligensie toepas, is
betreklike 'goeie presteerders' en ander is 'swak presteerders'. Daar word geglo dat die
prestasievlak van hierdie kompeterende intelligensie beïnvloed word deur organisatoriese
kultuur. Die implikasie is dat werknemers wat aangemoedig en opgelei is om aan dieselfde
dinge te glo en wat dieselfde waardes, norme en praktyke deel, in 'n beter posisie is om
inligting te deel en met 'n ope gemoed met mekaar om te gaan. Die vrye vloei van inligting is
die basiese bestanddeel wat help om doeltreffende kompeterende intelligensie te produseer.
Met die doelom na te vors of daar 'n statisties sinvolle verhouding bestaan tussen
organisatoriese kultuur en kompeterende intelligensie, is daar eers 'n literatuurstudie gedoen
om uit ander se werk te leer. Na die literatuuroorsig is daar 'n empiriese studie gedoen. Die
empiriese deel van die studie poog om na te vors of die vervaardigers en handelaars informele
kompeterende intelligensie toepas en ook of daar 'n positiewe verhouding bestaan tussen die
onafhanklike en afhanklike veranderlikes. Data is versamel deur middel van 'n vraelys aan
hoëvlak bestuurders. Nege-en-dertig vraelyste is uitgestuur waarvan 23 volledig deur die
organisasies ingevul is. Statistiese ontleding is toe gedoen om deur middel van die statistiese
pakket SPSS die korrelasies te bepaal.
Die verhouding tussen organisatoriese kultuur en kompeterende intelligensie is op twee
maniere bepaal: dit is eers gekorreleer in terme van die ses geselekteerde organisatoriese
kultuurdimensies (werknemer betrokkenheid, menslike hulpbronne, organisatoriese fokus,
kommunikasievloei., beloning en vertroue) en kompeterende intelligensie; en tweedens in
terme van tellings van elke maatskappy se organisatoriese kultuur en kompeterende
intelligensie. Die vlak van die telling het bepaal of die maatskappy goed presteer het of nie.
In albei gevalle is daar gevind dat daar 'n positiewe verhouding bestaan tussen organisatoriese
kultuur en prestasie in kompeterende intelligensie. Hierdie bevindinge ondersteun die
hipotese dat organisatoriese kultuur wel bydra tot verbeterde intelligensiepraktyke. Verder
bewys dit dat ondernemings in Eritrea redelik goed vaar in informele kompeterende
intelligensie.
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CHAPTERONE
BACKGROUND, RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter a brief history of the Eritrean trade and manufacturing sectors is discussed. To
highlight the procedural mechanism that this paper used to identify, analyse and present its
findings, concise descriptions of the research problem, development of the instrument for
measurement, the objective and delimitation of the research are presented.
1.2 Background of Eritrean Trade and Manufacturing sectors
Eritrea is a country with a population of 4 million. It is centrally located in the Hom of Africa
and the Middle East, with a coastline of 1200 kilometres and it covers an area of about
124,300square kilometres (Eritrea, 1994:3).
A paper submitted by the Eritrean delegation to a meeting of PTAICOMESA (1994:3)
indicated that prior to its occupation by Italy, the country had already established trade
contactswith Greece, Egypt, some Middle East countries, India etc. It was however, at the
time of the Italian occupation of the country (1889) that a strong economic infrastructure was
established. This led to the emergence of modem industries and improved transport facilities
that ushered in strong economic activity and trade. With the defeat of Italians in 1941, Eritrea
was placed under British administration up to 1952. During this period, activities of trade and
industry almost stagnated and the country lost much of its infrastructure and export markets.
The Eritrean economy was at its worst level during the period of Ethiopian socialist rule
(1974-1991). During that time, foreign trade sectors of the country collapsed rapidly. As the
result, Eritrea lost its previous competitive advantage and market share, and most of its
manufacturedproducts were confined to domestic markets.
The conflict (1998-2000) between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the 'no war' and 'no peace'
situationsfollowed thereafter might also have contributed to organizations not fully exploiting
the advantage of information (intelligence) as a decision-making mechanism to help their
businesses flourish.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
1.4 Measurement
Many studies indicated that there are quite a number of dimensions by which culture could be
measured. Van der Post, De Coning and Smit (1998:31) said "At the overt level, culture
1.3 Research problem and hypotheses
Since the various factors in the environment of managerial decisions are constantly changing
and, therefore, unpredictable, managers need to possess intelligence in decision-making if
they wish to succeed in their business pursuits and endeavours (Kyambalesa, 1993:23).
Managers of Eritrean enterprises in the command economy era however were not in a position
to enjoy such an advantage. The system in place was highly centralized to the extent that it
was only a "supervising Ministry" had a full mandate to control the whole system of each
organization (Eritrean Enterprise, 1996: 4). Such an inflexible hierarchical mechanism is
believed to be one of the obstacles that hinder organizations from having a favourable
organizational culture. A recent study conducted by Spio-Garbrah (1996:12) also revealed
that Eritrean traders and entrepreneurs lack access to information. Deshpande (2000:12) on
his part stated that Eritrean business communities don't know where to get proper trade
information.
Literature studies, on the other hand, underscore that in our contemporary globalized world
firms with information (intelligence) are more powerful than those without. To have
information as a tool of success however, organizations need to have a favourable
organizational culture whereby individuals and departments can exchange information to
create knowledge and intelligence. Kahaner (1996:186) for instance says "Culture plays a
large role in how competitive intelligence is practiced." Miller (2000:42) also supports the
effect of culture on the intelligence function of an organization.
The hypotheses that were explored during the course of this study concerning the question
"Do the selected Organizational Culture dimensions relate to competitive intelligence
performance?" were:
Hypothesis 1: Unfavourable organizational culture impacts negatively on the practice of
competitive intelligence by Eritrean manufacturers and traders.
Hypothesis 2: The selected dimensions of organizational culture are positively related to
competitive intelligence performance.
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1.7 Delimitation
This paper is restricted to selected dimensions, which are mainly focused on the
communicational and motivational aspects of organizational culture as independent variables.
To use other variables as a benchmark for measuring other contributing factors to competitive
implies the existence of certain dimensions or characteristics that are closely associated and
interdependent. Generally, however, research on organizational culture does not specify a set
of uniform dimensions or characteristics. It is evident that researchers have applied a large
number of dimensions of organization culture that cannot be neatly categorized in terms of an
overall organizational culture theory."
For this study, culture dimensions have been selected from the literature review to measure if
an organization deliberately and purposefully manages its culture. Such measurement has
been conducted through a questionnaire which was developed based upon the culture
dimensions identified. With regard to competitive intelligence, the questionnaire was
constructed on the basis of the four phases of the competitive intelligence cycle: Planning and
focus, gathering information, analysing information, and disseminating intelligence.
1.6 Objectives of the study
The main purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between selected dimensions
of organizational culture and informal competitive intelligence practice in some Eritrean
entrepreneurs and traders. The reason why this paper uses the term "informal" is the fact that
in Eritrea there is no organization that formally conducts competitive intelligence practice.
However, it is obvious that regardless of their magnitude all organizations involved in
competitive intelligence practice informally. The intention of the researcher, therefore, was to
determine whether this informal competitive intelligence practice and the selected parts of
organizational culture are related. In addition to that, the final report can act as a wake-up-call
for Eritrean organizations to pay more attention to their organizational culture in order to
improve the practice of competitive intelligence in their respective companies. At the same
time, it is hoped that the recommendations will move concerned government bodies to take
steps to provide organizations with essential support in order to take initiatives to introduce
formal competitive intelligence practice.
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intelligence practice is beyond the scope of this research. Moreover, the administration of the
questionnaire, which was directed only to a single top manager of each organization, though
measuring different perceptions of key stakeholders, might yield more results.
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CHAPTERTWO
LITERATURE REVIEW ON ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
2.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the definitions of organizational culture, and how it affects people's
interaction and communication. Values, beliefs, norms, practices, and behaviours are the
essence of organizational culture that makes or breaks the active involvement of employees in
exchanging information. Information-sharing however will only evolve in an environment
where motivational incentives are in place. Many researchers agree that organizational culture
can indeed make a difference to the performance of an enterprise.
2.2 Defining organizational culture
A number of researchers defined organizational culture from different viewpoints.
Organizational culture is a system of shared actions, values and beliefs that are nurtured
within an organization and determines the behaviours and the day to day activities of
members.
Organizational culture can be broadly defined as the collectivist of norms and individuals'
behaviours within an organizational setting and their underlying explicit or implicit rationales
such as values, beliefs, and principles (Fahey, 1999:420). Culture is also about 'how things
are done around here'. It is about what is typical of the organization, the habits, the prevailing
attitudes, and the grown-up pattern of accepted and expected behaviour (Drennan, 1992:3).
Similarly, Oma (1990:39) says that any organization has its own, more or less explicit, culture
and values; not what it does but the way that it does it. It embraces the way the enterprise
regards itself, the people who work for it, and its 'public'; the way it presents itself to them;
and the way it treats them.
According to Schein (1999: 42) one reason it takes time before one can become productive in
a new organization is because so many of the norms, ways of working, and ways of thinking
are unique to that organization and have to be learned by trial and error. Oster (1994:134)
stated that corporate culture is hard to imitate. Even the leader of an organization embodies its
culture only to a limited extent. Thus, an organization's culture, because it is hard to imitate,
may produce a competitive edge. Oster (1994:134) also argues that invisible or intangible
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
2.3 Characteristics of organizational culture
Different researchers describe the characteristics of organizational culture in terms of the
deeply rooted values, norms, beliefs and behaviours residing in an organization and its
individual members and almost all have similar outlooks regarding the level and function of
these cultural elements within an organization. Thus, while behaviour resides at the surface
level, values refer to the deeply held beliefs, which depict the shared mental models that the
members of an organization hold and take for granted.
Fahey (1999:420) states that a culture consists of four elements namely behaviours, norms,
beliefs and values. According to the researcher, these elements are highly interrelated but they
also differ greatly in their visibility and accessibility. He elaborates these elements as follows:
Behaviours reside at the culture's surface and refer to the everyday activities of individuals in
their organizational capacity, such as what they do and how they do it. Norms, on the other
hand, are reflected in general organizational practices or behaviour patterns, such as 'always
subjugate your own interests to those of the team, group, or organization'. Norms do not just
assets like corporate culture are often the only sustainable source of competitive edge,
primarily because such advantages are so difficult to imitate.
Culture is both product and process. As product, it embodies the accumulated wisdom of
members of an organization. As process, it is continually renewed and re-created as new
members are taught the old ways and eventually become teachers themselves (Bolman &
Deal, 1991:250). This means that over a period of time in any company people develop
particular ways of handling the recurrent work of the organization, and gradually this
becomes the 'accepted' way of doing things. By repetition, these ways of doing things
become habits and that is what culture is: the habits that have grown up over time and became
part of the organization's personality (Drennan, 1992:1).
Culture is the property of a group. Wherever a group has enough common experience, a
culture begins to form. An individual, therefore, is a multicultural entity and displays different
cultural behaviours depending on what the situation elicits. But if he spends the bulk of his
life in a given occupation and organization, he takes many of the cultural themes that others in
the occupation or organization share (Schein, 1999:13). Culture is not an individual
characteristic, but rather denotes a set of common mental programmes, beliefs, assumptions
and values shared by a group of people.
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happen. They are learned, assimilated, and reinforced. Beliefs are to do with the cause-effect
understandings that a group of individuals share about their world. Beliefs are less specific
than the norms governing daily behaviour; they offer more general guidelines about how
organizational members should act to obtain desired results. And finally, values constitute
culture's deepest level. They are defined as what the organization and its members consider
important, or profess to care about. Values communicate to organizational members what the
organization stands for and what it believes in. Values are the most inaccessible elements of
culture.
Choo (2002:54), on his part, indicates that values are the deeply held beliefs about the goals
and identity of the organization, and how it should go about attaining those goals. These
values are often hard to articulate and even harder to change. Norms on the other hand are
derived from values, but have a more direct influence on information behaviours. Norms are
rules or socially accepted standards that defme what is normal or to be expected in the
organization. Norms or rules may be informal or formal. Informal norms or attitudes
influence the creation, flow and use of information in individuals and groups. Formal rules,
routines, and policies may exist to plan, guide, and control information as an organizational
asset. Practices, which are the third character of organizational culture, refer to repeated
patterns of behaviour that involve organizational rules, structures, and forms of interaction.
They are revealed by observing or describing how people find, organize, use and share
information as part of their normal work patterns. Certain organizational practices or policies
may act as impediment or incentives to the effective use of information. That is why, Denison
(1990:4) says, "Concrete policies and practices are often difficult to separate from the core
value and beliefs and the system of shared meaning that supports them".
Kotter and Heskett (1992:4) indicate that organizational culture has two levels, which differ in
terms of their visibility and their resistance to change. At the deeper and less visible level,
culture refers to values that are shared by the people in a group and that tend to persist over
time even when group membership changes. At the more visible level, culture represents the
behaviour patterns or style of an organization that new employees are automatically
encouraged to follow by their fellow employees. Each level of culture has a natural tendency
to influence the other. This is perhaps most obvious in terms of shared values influencing a
group's behaviour and commitment to customers, for example, influencing how quickly
individuals tend to respond to customer complaints.
Values are the bedrock of any corporate culture. As the essence of a company's philosophy
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ofor achieving success, values provide a sense of common direction for all employees and
guidelines for their day-ta-day behaviour (Deal & Kennedy, 1982:21). Organizations derive
great strength from shared values. If employees know what their company stands for, if they
know what standards they are to uphold, then they are much more likely to make decisions
that they will support those standards. One of the most serious risks of a potent system of
shared values is that economic circumstances such as a newly competitive market can change
while shared values continue to guide behaviour in ways no longer helpful to the
organization's success.
Culture is so stable and difficult to change because it represents the accumulated learning of a
group - the ways of thinking, feeling, and perceiving the world that have made the group
successful (Schein, 1999:21). One must therefore assume, at least in the short run, that culture
cannot be changed to meet the demands of management (Jaeger & Kanungo, 1990:132).
Thus, organizations which do not have any formal programmes for nurturing and continually
updating the culture residing in their workers should not be surprised when more flexible
competitors perform well and win their old customers.
2.4 Impact of organizational culture on performance
Culture is integrally entwined in every facet of what an organization does and how it does it
(Fahey, 1999:420). In general, when employees start to believe the stories about what the
company really values, they soon start doing the same. This belief penetrates deeply and
becomes part of the company culture, so that it affects how people act, talk and think
(Drennan, 1992:27). Van Der Post et al. (1997:39) reached the conclusion that organizations
in which members experience the cultural dimensions to a greater degree are likely to be
financially more successful than those organizations where members experience the cultural
dimensions to a lesser degree.
Kotter and Heskett (1992:5) indicate three ideas on how organizational culture relates to
performance. The first one is goal alignment. This concept implies that strong culture inclines
employees to march to the same drummer. Secondly, a strong culture may help an
organization to perform because it can create an unusual level of motivation in members. And
thirdly, a strong culture can provide the needed structure and controls without having to rely
on a stifling formal bureaucracy that can dampen motivation and innovation.
Denison (1990:6) on his part indicates that organizational culture that provides direction,
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On an individual level, organizational culture can impact an employee's participation and
involvement (Zamanou & Glaser, 1994:490). The shared perceptions and beliefs that make up
an organization's culture are fostered and cultivated by communications and interactions
among people inside and outside of the organization. The culture then impacts and can be
influenced by people's behaviour regarding various things, such as how to solve problems,
how to do a job, and how to communicate (Bates et al., 1995:1574). These in turn, affect an
individual's job performance and satisfaction, and then impact on a firm's performance. .
~ ~~R'S\i"'-'\c' C,
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involvement, consistency, adaptability and innovation by its human resource, contributes
positively towards organizational performance. Involvement, according to the researcher, has
to do with flexible management style and participation of employees. Organizational
effectiveness is, therefore, a function of the level of involvement and participation of an
organization's members.
Grindle (1997) looks at the relationship between organizational culture and performance from
the perspective of developing countries' context. According to his statement, in an attempt to
increase efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness of the public sector; many developing
countries introduced the so-called "second generation" reform, which has been focused on
improving salaries and conditions of employment as well as reducing the size and
responsibilities of the state sectors. Nevertheless, these macro-institutional initiatives have not
solved the problem of poor performance. Yet throughout the developing world, there were
organizations that performed relatively well, despite dauntingly unfavourable contexts and
despite overall poor public sector performance. Based on a study conducted in six developing
countries, the author reached the conclusion that organizational culture was the main driving
force for the success of good performers. Jaeger and Kanungo (1990: 64) also indicate that the
poor performance of state-owned enterprises in developing countries has been attributed to
cultural factors.
Wilson (2002:60) states that teams of knowledge workers could not perform effectively
without norms of truthfulness, openness and trust. Such teams can only perform in hierarchies
if they insulate themselves from the prevailing organizational culture. Teams must form,
storm, norm, and then perform. At the storming stage, members must learn to be open and
truthful about what they believe. Of course this exposes differences of opinion that must be
resolved, often heatedly. When the storming is over, the group accepts norms of behaviour for
resolving differences. This will lay the ground for open communications that are essential for
the team to perform.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
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Hence, organizational culture can have a positive effect on competitive advantage, increased
productivity, and a firm's performance (Yeung, Brockbank, & Ulrich, 1991:61).
Unlike in a weak culture, those employees who know exactly what is expected of them will
waste only little time on deciding how to act in a given situation. The researchers estimated
that a company can gain as much as one or two hours of productive work per employee per
day (Deal & Kennedy, 1982:15). A strong culture, with well-socialized members, improves
effectiveness because it facilitates the exchange of information and coordination of behaviour
(Denison, 1990:9). In strong cultures, networks carry the beliefs and values that keep the
culture alive and shared across levels, divisions, and among people (Deal & Kennedy,
1982:98). Building a strong culture implies that values and actions are highly consistent. This
form of consistency has often been mentioned as a source of organizational strength and as a
way of improving performance and effectiveness (Denison, 1990:4).
There are, however, a number of controversies surrounding the relationship between culture
and performance as well as the type of indicator used to show performance. Some argue that
cohesive cultures result from organizational success. Others point out that cohesive cultures
produce better performance only if the cultural patterns fit the demands of the marketplace
(Bolman & Deal, 1991:268). Regarding indicators, many scholars argue that organizations are
primarily information-processing and decision-making entities, and thus the characteristics of
these processes will be the foremost determinants and indicators of effectiveness. On the
contrary, another "reactive"theory of organizational effectiveness comes from the population
ecology perspective. According to this argument, it is the environment that determines which
types of organizations will survive and which will not, and that the actions of individuals and
organizations are relatively weak determinants of effectiveness. Hence, certain "species" of
organizations will grow to fill a particular "niche" and will decline accordingly when the
demand for that particular type of organization diminishes (Denison, 1990:37).
Jaeger and Kanungo (1990:134) look at the above argument from the point of view of cultural
differences between developed and developing countries. According to them, most western
industrialized societies generally see themselves as being in control of nature and of events. In
contrast, developing societies are more influenced by events in the environment. Thus, in
developing countries, the notion of context dependence will be more likely to guide behaviour
in organizations. The writer of this paper however, argues that whether it is in the developed
or developing world, those organizations that have implemented competitive intelligence
programs are in a better position not to remain passive and at the mercy of the environmental
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
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influence.As a future oriented mechanism, competitive intelligence can help a company to act
proactively upon events that might have positive or negative effects, especially if it has a
cultureof sharing information among its human resources.
2.5The human aspect of organizational culture
2.5.1Importance of the people
If organizational culture impacts a firm's performance or productivity, it is because the
organizational culture impacted individuals first, which in turn affected a firm's overall
performance, productivity, or competitive advantage (Sheng, 2003:44). Work is done by
peoplewho make up an organization, not by the organization itself. Organizational culture is
ultimately manifested, represented and maintained by sense-making efforts and actions of
individuals (Harris, 1994:315).
Because organizational culture acts as a filter through which members grasp the realities
insideand outside the organization, organizational culture affects practically all aspects of the
way people of a group interact with each other (Weber & Pliskin, 1996). People at all stages
of their careers, therefore, need to understand culture and how it works because it is likely to
have a powerful effect on their work lives. When they choose a company, for instance, they
choose a way of life. Culture then can make them fast or slow workers, tough or friendly
managers, team players or individuals. By the time they've worked for several years, they
maybe so well conditioned by the culture they may not even recognize it (Deal & Kennedy,
1982:16).
Any organization attempting to create an information and learning culture that promotes
knowledge creation and use, will need to start with the recognition that information use is a
social, collective sense-making process. Education and training may be required to raise the
awareness of the value of information, to increase understanding of what information has
potential significance, and to enhance information-searching and information-use skills
(Choo, 2002:256). Information sharing is not something that always goes smoothly and
willingly.There are people who want to maintain communication in a way that fits their own
personal interest. Obviously, such activities lead to misunderstandings and tensions among
individualsas well as between employees and an organization.
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Tensions could also be created because of members of an organization's different needs,
perceptions and expectations. These mean that in such a situation communication will not
always be perfect. For example, superiors might wish to get certain information from
subordinates. The subordinates might not wish to give this information. On the other hand,
2.5.2 Tension between individual members and an organization
Organizations and people depend on one another. People look to organizations to satisfy a
variety of economic, personal, and social needs, and organizations in turn cannot function
effectively without the energy and talent of their employees (Bolman & Deal, 1991:130).
Most of us have learned to think of organizations as places where large numbers of people
efficiently cooperate with one another to achieve some shared objectives. But organizations
also are sites in which multiple different tensions exist, tensions that must be managed
successfully if the organization is to succeed in meeting the goals of its members. The
fundamental tension that faces all organizations is a tension between individual members'
needs and the need of their organizations. People have needs for autonomy to control their
destinies, creativity of doing something better than or in a different way than anyone else, and
sociability of interpersonal relationships with other people (Conrad & Scott, 1998:7).
Similarly, most people conduct their interpersonal relationships in ways that fit their own
styles and preferences, sometimes disregarding what the organization or anyone around them
wants. Those needs often conflict with organizational rules and requirements (Bolman &
Deal, 1991:134). Organizational researchers in the Western societies seem to have
rediscovered the idea that people, including workers, are "actors". This means they are living,
thinking beings who make decisions about how to act based on their beliefs, values, and ways
of interpreting the information and events that they encounter (Conrad & Scott, 1998:114).
And as Max Weber and others had argued a century ago, those beliefs, values, and frames of
reference were influenced significantly by the taken-for-granted assumptions characteristic of
the societies from which organizations drew their members. The first discovery revealed that
organizational culture could create a sense of community that bound employees together in a
coordinated and controlled group. And the second assumed that although people often have
similar interpretive frames because they have had similar societal backgrounds and
",
experience, they also interpret their surroundings in their own, individual way. Consequently,
while managers could attempt to persuade their employees to accept certain beliefs and
values, the workers might interpret and respond to management's efforts in very different
ways than they intended.
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subordinates might feel that they are entitled to certain information. However, superiors might
feel that this information is confidential, and therefore refuse to give it to them (Fielding,
1993:41).As a result, shared beliefs that are a crucial part of an organization's knowledge and
intelligence cannot prevail. People in an organization use these assumptions and beliefs to
make sense of their environment, and to figure out the form and purpose of their actions
(Choo, 2002:271). When the fit between the needs of an organization and the needs of its
participants is matched, both benefit: individuals find satisfaction and meaning in work, while
the organization is able to make effective use of the talent and energy of its managers and
workers (Bolman & Deal, 1991:179).
Strongly held beliefs, a sense of mission, or the consistency that comes from a set of shared
values and beliefs do provide a fundamental basis for coordinated action within an
organization (Denison, 1990:6). One of the importance of shared norms, beliefs and
expectations have been shown to shape employee orientations towards communication and
information sharing and determine the extent to which individuals direct their behaviour
toward achieving goals defined by the organization rather than to those that conform
exclusively to self interest (Grindle, 1997). This conformity would be successful if there is a
proper way of managing a culture in an organization.
2.5.3 Managing culture
Every organization has a quite different internal work culture of its own which influences the
behaviour or practices of both the management and the workers (Jaeger & Kanungo, 1990:2).
This culture creates value because it allows that organization to strike deals with its suppliers,
customers and employees that are not available to other firms. Thus, culture is an
organizational asset. An organization with a culture that stresses management stability, for
example, can ask for greater specific investments by its managers than an organization with
higher manager turnover. An organization with a tradition of social responsibility also may be
able to strike a better deal with a local community in a location decision than a rival with a
reputation as irresponsib le (Oster, 1994:134).
Many agree that people's wonderful ideas and enormous potential is a key to better
performance. What they need is positive leadership to cultivate their potential, encouragement
to voice their ideas, and continuing support as they follow through on their own creativity
(Bennis & Mische, 1995:77). In relationship between culture and leadership, although some
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Jones and Tilley (2003:89) recommend that general managers engage with the strategic issues
involved in the management of people, with the aim of introducing 'people issues'. This is
argue that leaders are shaped by culture, others believe that, at least under some conditions,
leaders can shape culture. So, leadership in this regard is very important (Bolman & Deal,
1991:268). Probably the hottest topic in organizations and management training during the
1980s was the concept of organizational culture. An entire industry of training programs,
videotapes, consulting firms, and speakers is devoted to teaching employees how to "manage"
the cultures of their organizations. These activities have been valuable because they have
focused attention on the intangible and human aspects of organizational life. Managers have
started to realize that employees' beliefs about how their organization operates are important,
even more important than how official documents say it does (Conrad & Scott, 1998: 113).
McMaster (1996:6) believes that the management theory that we have today is out of date and
is based on design principles that are not appropriate for the current state of thinking and
technology. This inherent theory is based on the view of an organization as a production
machine and people as the major part of the machine. The management theories that
accompany this thinking treat people as tools to serve the goals of the systems. As the result
of this thinking, management considers systems as controls on people, communication as
directional, authority as hierarchical, and reward systems as a means for motivation. Hence,
the job is to engineer a production machine where the parts, including people, will act in
reliable and predictable ways. There is no allowance for creativity or intelligent reaction to
unpredictable changes in the environment. Denison (1990:16) also added a similar concept
by saying that people are treated as expenses rather than assets, and are thus managed with an
eye to reducing cost rather than increasing return on assets.
Fielding (1993:35) states that studies of organizations in the early part of this century
emphasized a rigid structure, order, and precise, scientific reasoning. They paid little attention
to communication in organizations. Workers were considered to be little more than extensions
of machines. Later theorizers however, began to stress the importance of human factors in
organizations. They suggested that the existence of formal lines of communication within a
formal structure was not enough to guarantee that a job would be done. People's needs,
interests, and viewpoints are important in the functioning of an organization. These latter
theorists have stressed participative styles of management that strive to generate an
atmosphere of trust and confidence. If this type of atmosphere is generated, motivation will be
high.
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2.5.4 Motivation for better communication and information sharing
No delays in waiting for orders from above or loss of information about the current situation
in the down-top communication can occur if employees on every level of an organizational
hierarchy know where the organization is going. True employee empowerment and
participation is necessary in order to make decisions faster on lower levels of the
organizational hierarchy. Drennan (1992:89), however, believes that many companies treat
employeecommunication as ifit were an 'add-on' to the business, something done 'because it
is a good thing', or 'to keep employees informed'. But communication is not something that
is confined simply to what is said in monthly meetings or team briefings, it goes on
continuously in every business, every day of the week, every hour of the day.
The reason why effective communication is central to all organizations is the fact that it
makes organizations possible and creates well-motivated people who can work together
(Fielding, 1993:27). And the most important environmental factor affecting human
communications at work is the culture of the organization. Is there a culture of individualism,
or team work? Are people generally supportive and trusting of each other, or competitive?
Are people open, honest and truthful about what they believe, or does a blame culture make
people secretive, devious and careful about what they say (Wilson, 2002:60)? If an
atmosphere of participation is to be created, then there needs to be a great deal of open
communication. This communication should take place in an atmosphere of trust. People also
need to work together in an atmosphere of understanding. Teamwork needs to be encouraged
and the goals should be set by the whole group, rather than imposed on them (Fielding,
reinforced through the promotion of a unitary view of organizational and employee goals,
achieved through the active management of 'the culture' in the work place, 'winning the
hearts and minds' of employees to encourage greater commitment to organizational goals. A
recent research project, conducted in more than 50 organizations by De Long and Fahey
(2000), confirmed that most managers have recognized organizational culture as the major
barrier to creating and leveraging knowledge assets.
It is only when everyone is involved in doing things differently in a business that truly the
culture has moved, both in depth and for the long-term. But, unless there is a motivational
scheme in place, people might not be inspired to involve in an open communication and
information-sharing process.
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1993:35).
Many researchers involved in the field of knowledge management believe that employees
share information in an easy way if there is trust and motivation within organizations. In strict
command-and-control hierarchies, for instance, there are always more senior people around,
who have the power to promote or fire an employee. This has two obvious effects: an
employee will not disagree with his boss's ideas; and he will not contribute to a colleague's
ideas, because he will benefit more if his own idea prevails (Wilson, 2002: 61). This means,
because knowledge is intimately connected with people's egos and occupations, knowledge
sharing does not flow easily across role or functional boundaries. It is important, therefore, to
create reward systems in order to encourage employee behaviour (Davenport & De Long,
1998). The things that an employee has previously been rewarded for in his business are what
have helped to produce the culture he has now (Drennan, 1992:185).
Trust perhaps is the single most important sub-factor that determines the success of
knowledge management initiatives. Persuading people to share their knowledge requires not
only new processes, but also a new treaty between employers and employees, as well as
between employees and employees. This means that employees need reassurance that they are
still valued after they give up their knowledge (Martin, 2000; Davenport and De Long, 1998).
The importance of trust is also reaffirmed by De Long and Fahey (2000) who say that the
level of trust that exists within an organization is greatly influenced by the amount of
knowledge that was shared, both between individuals and from individuals into an
organization's knowledge management initiative.
Oster (1994:147) suggests that an organization that wants to make its staff realize the
importance of competitive intelligence has to put incentives in place for motivational reasons.
This motivation and awareness will help to make people willing to exchange information as
freely as possible. Making the whole organization believe in the value of competitive
intelligence means to have a network of humans who are willing to search their memories and
give the pertinent knowledge to the relevant person. Too often, a decision maker does not
have the necessary information because the person who could give it either does not know its
importance or does not know who needs it. Choo (2002:256) also stressed that organizational
norms and structures may have to be modified to produce the cultural shift: information
gathering and sharing could be formally recognized in job descriptions; forums and group or
team structures may be initiated to facilitate information sharing and cooperative
collaboration which is important for the practice of competitive intelligence.
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2.6 Conclusion
Many writers claim that in our modem society, knowledge and intelligence are factors needed
for an organization to gain a competitive edge. They also agree that unless there is an open
way of sharing information among stakeholders, it is difficult to create knowledge and
intelligence. But, only people with shared values and beliefs can easily communicate with
each other in a smooth and open manner. Therefore, organizational culture, which comprises
values, beliefs and behaviours is the main driving force for the success of competitive
intelligence.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
CHAPTER THREE
LITERATURE REVIEW ON COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE
3.1 Introduction
The following chapter will elaborate on the cycle of the competitive intelligence process.
First, a definition of the practice is presented to make it clear what competitive intelligence is
all about. This is followed by an analysis of the four stages: planning, gathering, analysing,
and disseminating. Finally, the chapter is concluded by emphasizing the relationship between
organizational culture and competitive intelligence.
3.2 Defining competitive intelligence
Whenever there is more than a single source of product or service, competition is an
inevitable and natural consequence (West, 2001: xi). The growth of an enterprise therefore,
often depends on its ability to gain a competitive edge by establishing new standards of
performance in the market place. To achieve this, an enterprise needs not only to master its
own activities, but also to have relevant information about competitors to position itself and
its products or services against competitors (Du Toit, 114). Organizations that don't
understand the new discipline of modem business such as flexibility and responsiveness to
customers will eventually disappear, as other organizations take over their role by offering
better perceived value to the market (Wilson, 2002:25). Organizations that practice
competitive intelligence are in a better position to address such issues.
Competitive intelligence management is a well-established function ill enterprise. In
developed countries, managers realize that if they do not monitor the actions and activities of
their competitors, their strategic plans would fail. However, enterprises in developing
countries continue to be surprised by undesirable changes in the environment and it appears
that the advances in managing intelligence are as yet largely unknown to these countries (Du
Toit, 114). It is probably true that even some companies in developed countries do succeed
without a formal system for competitor intelligence by relying on the intuition or judgement
of a few people. But for most companies this is too great a risk to take, and a formal and
efficient system is needed (pollard, 1999:6). For a successful competitive advantage, an
organization's intelligence system must comprise the principles of consistency, longevity and
involvement. This means they must gather information constantly; they must invest in the
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intelligence program for the long term; and spread responsibility for collection and analysis of
information across the entire organization in order to gain competitive edge (Fuld, 1995 :420).
The aim of competitive intelligence is to understand customers, regulators, competitors, and
so forth better, in an attempt to create new opportunities. In fact, often, the deeper objective of
intelligence is the forecasting or predicting of some future events or changes in the
marketplace or business environment. One way for an organization to earn higher returns than
other similarly placed organizations is for it to see and seize new lucrative opportunities early.
But, intelligent organizations succeed not only when presented with opportunity, but also in
the face of obstacles or opposition. Intelligent organizations will know how to create
opportunity where before there was none and create the change to which others must react, in
other words, being ahead of change or even changing the rules of the game. This would be
manifested in terms of launching a new market as well as raising the industry standard of
services and products (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998:4; Calof & Viviers, 2001:62; Cook &
Cook, 2000:6; Oster, 1994:115).
Oftentimes, loss of market share, lower revenues, competitor movements, and other
significant events that impact on a firm negatively are also signals that compel managers to
seek input about their business environment (Miller, 2000:31). There are also a number of
possible explanations for the emergence of competitive intelligence in organizations. These
include: first, the information explosion that is characterized by the increasing availability and
accessibility of information from different sources; and second, the very nature of the times in
which we are living now, such as the worldwide political and social changes, the increasing
pace of business, the increase of global competition from new competitors, and rapid
technological change (Du Toit, 2003: 113).
But, what is competitive intelligence all about? Pollard (1999:3) defmes competitor
intelligence as the output of a systematic and legal process for the gathering and analysing of
information about the current and potential competitors of a business. These practices help
organizations to innovate, to generate knowledge, and to act effectively based on the
knowledge they have generated (McMaster, 1996:3).
Competitive intelligence is also necessary to reduce uncertainty and risk in decision-making
(Fleisher and Bensoussan, 2002:6). Just as card games are easier to win when players have
either seen or deduced their opponents' hands, competition is easier to engage in when the
current and future activities of the competitors are anticipated (West, 2001:12).
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• To discover new or potential competitors;
Effective competitive intelligence is not a function; it is a process. Therefore, it should appear
in all aspects of the business as one seamless, continuous activity not relegated to one area,
division, or unit. This continuous on-going process of competitive intelligence provides extra
insight, which empowers the management to make better-qualified business decisions (Chen,
Chau& Zeng, 2002; Kahaner, 1996:23; Kysu, 2003).
Competitive intelligence is not just market research, or business scanmng. Competitive
intelligence is a process of knowing what the competition is up to and staying one step ahead
of them (Teo & Choo, 2001 :67). Competitive intelligence is also not industrial espionage.
Ninety percent of all information that a company needs to make critical decisions and to
understand its market and competitors is already public or can be systematically developed
from public data (MacGonagle & Vella, 1998:68). Competitive intelligence programs are the
foundation on which organizational objectives, strategies and tactics are built, assessed and
modified (Cook & Cook, 2000:5; The society of Canada, 1996).
Today, most organizations realize that they cannot increase growth and profitability without a
strong understanding of their competitor's business and activities. However, few firms have
applied their knowledge of their competitors in a proactive, disciplined, systematic fashion to
achieve a competitive advantage. The complexity of business and an uncertain economic
climate, create a need for corporations to become far more sophisticated at scrutinizing their
competition. Thus, an effective competitive intelligence program becomes necessary if an
organization is to succeed in a changing competitive environment (The society of Canada,
1996).
In summary, the scholars define competitive intelligence as a systematic and ethical process
that helps organizations to identify, gather, analyse and disseminate information in order to
forecast the future and act upon it.
3.3 Competitive intelligence cycle and its importance
Although the main objective of competitive intelligence is to support decision making, having
a formalized competitive intelligence system in place can also help a company improve
business performance including:
• To provide early warning signs of opportunities and threats;
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• To better adapt and respond to changes among competitors;
• To learn from the successes and failures of others;
• To look at one's own business practices with an open mind;
• To validate or invalidate industry rumours;
• To plug information leaks within an organization;
• To learn about new technologies, products, and processes that affect a business
• To base strategic planning decisions on relevant and timely competitive advantage;
and
• To provide a systematic audit of the organization's competitiveness that gives the
CEO an unfiltered assessment of the firm's relative position
(Cook & Cook, 2000:14; Kahaner, 1996:23; Pollard, 1999:8; The society of Canada, 1996).
The four fundamental areas of the competitive intelligence process, identified by Calof (1999)
include: first, Receiving the intelligence request within the organization, understanding the
question or information need, and identifying how it relates to the organizational culture.
Second, Collect information via primary and secondary sources with understanding
objectiveness and biases of resource. Third, Analysing the information, searching for gaps,
and interpreting the relationship to organization needs. Fourth, Communicating results to
decision-making bodies and other end-users. Similarly, Cook & Cook (2000:6) have also
described the competitive intelligence cycle as planning and direction, collection and
research, processing and storage, analysis and production, and dissemination and delivery.
3.4 Planning and direction
In the process of competitive intelligence practice though, finding any information from
different comers seems to be easy; finding information that is relevant and useful is more
difficult. Therefore, before starting to gather information, organizations need first to plan in
order to decide what types of information might be important to satisfy their requirements. In
the absence of a definition of its information needs, an organization may not be able to
position its resources and direct the process of competitive intelligence effectively.
Fuld (1995:422) stated that just as companies write a strategic plan in order to apply their
limited resources appropriately, so an intelligence program must determine its objectives and
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Decision-makers do not always know what they want; or the decision-makers know what they
want but fail to communicate it effectively to their employees (Cook & Cook, 2000: 158).
Unveiling information needs in such situations is a complex, fuzzy communication process.
Personal information needs therefore have to be understood by placing them in the real-world
context in which the person experiences the need, and in the context in which the person will
use the information to make sense of his environment and so take action (Choo, 1995:29). To
effectively conduct such a task, however, competitive intelligence practitioners need to draw
apply its resources in the most efficient and effective manner through needs assessment. A
need assessment is a means of gauging how an organization actually handles the internal
information flow. Such processes also help organizations to: 1, Determine the most
commonly needed information; 2, Identify widely used internal resources; 3, Locate
communication channels and the vehicles people use to communicate.
However, effective implementation of competitive intelligence requires not only information
about the competitors, but also information on other environmental trends that affect business
activities as a whole. These include industry trends, legal and regulatory trends, international
trends, technology developments, political developments and bad economic conditions. In the
increasingly complex and uncertain business environment, the external factors are assuming
greater importance in effecting organizational change. If, for instance, a manager is collecting
competitive intelligence in a foreign territory, he has to make sure what benefits competitor
organizations can get from their respective governments or regional offices. This will help
organizations to gather information in accordance with the needs of that particular context. In
line with this concept, Malhotra (1996) said "the determination of competitive intelligence
information needs is based upon the firm's relative competitive advantage over the competitor
assessed within the 'network' of 'environmental' factors."
On the other hand, assessment also helps organizations to determine the objectives of their
competitive intelligence projects or processes, to allocate resources, and to decide which
course they should take in fulfilling their task, as well as to establish the purpose of the
findings. An intelligence exercise is as good as the initial plan. Accordingly, the content of the
ideal intelligence plan should include: background information; the product or service to be
covered; the competitors to be covered and any relevant internally available information on
them; the overall objectives of the exercise; potential intelligence sources and contacts;
confidentiality; timing; budgetary and other constraints (Calof et al., 2002:28; Fuld, 1995:422;
Kahaner, 1996:43; West, 2001:147).
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3.5 Collection
When an organization has some knowledge of its competitors and its own competitive
intelligence needs, it proceeds to the stage of gathering information (Malhotra, 1996). Such
information is important in helping firms to know how competitive their respective company
is now and how competitive will it be in the coming few years? What is really happening in
the market, industry or company? Having reliable information at hand at the right time means
staying in a better position to take effective decisions, reduce uncertainty, and be able to move
quickly (Tzu, 2003).
Collection involves obtaining the raw information that will be turned into usable intelligence
(Kahaner, 1996:53). Although, knowing the right thing at the right time and acting on it is
critical to success in the information age, many companies collect a vast quantity of data and
upon specific sets of skills. For instance, to identify key decision makers and their intelligence
needs, an individual must have the skill and confidence to communicate with top
administrators. Knowledge of the industry and its specific terminology, as well as an
appreciation of corporate power structures and decision making processes will help
professionals place intelligence needs within the appropriate context (Miller, 2000:58).
Moreover, they must understand what the intelligence will be used for, why it is needed, what
kind of intelligence is expected and for whom? When do they need it? Exactly which people
or department will use it (Kahaner, 1996:49; The society of Canada, 1996)?
Once competitive intelligence practitioners are ready to start researching, it is advisable to
take an inventory of the things they and their co-workers already know (Cook & Cook,
2000:38). Many companies don't realize that there is a wealth of knowledge in their own
organizations, and in their customers and former customers. Competitive intelligence
practitioners rely on publications, suppliers and customers as the most popular sources of
information, followed by company employees, industry experts, the Internet, industry
conferences, and commercial databases. In fact an enormous amount of information already
exists within a firm but it is usually ignored, unorganised and untapped (Farrell, 2003). To
avoid such shortcomings, an organization must conduct a competitive intelligence audit to
determine what is actually known about the competitors and their operations (Malhotra,
1996). "An intelligence audit literally means identifying the experts and other sources of
knowledge extant throughout your organization." Fuld (1995:423).
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3.5.1 Primary sources
Primary sources are mainly people who are in a position to provide intelligence when
questioned and direct observation of competitors' activities on the ground, from the air or
even by satellite. It is about information that has not been changed, altered, or otherwise
tainted by opinions or selection. These include the staff of competitor companies and the staff
of companies that work with them and have some form of business relationship. It could also
be a company CEO, president, government agency, or someone else who has access to
information in an effort to learn more or know more than their competitors. The reality,
however, is that very little of that information is used or has any value (Cook & Cook,
2000:2). Organizations should collect all the available information but focus on those issues
of highest importance to end users (Calof et al., 2002:28).
A competitive intelligence professional must also create an internal as well as external
network of human resources in order to collect rich and valuable data. An internal network
helps to energise the people inside the organization to release the information inside their
heads (pollard, 1999:91). External human sources on the other hand consist of everyone who
could provide relevant information about the external environment; these sources include
customers, suppliers, distributors, competitors and many others. Information from external
human sources, especially those that are trusted or perceived to be in the know, can have a
large impact on decision-making (Choo, 2002:166). To keep the wheels of the network
moving forward however, the organizations have to maintain interest and consider incentives.
Team-building exercises should take place at the beginning before managers expect
employees to generate intelligence. People need recognition and acknowledgement, which is
vital for contributions. In addition to that, companies should provide feedback to those
supplying them with information (pollard, 1999:94).
According to Kahaner (1996:56) companies with competitive intelligence programs engage in
two kinds of collection procedures. First, they collect information either for a specific reason
or in response to a request from management. Second, they collect information that is saved
and built into an ongoing data bank about one company, one industry, and so on. This
information is updated regularly so it can be consulted when needed. In general, however,
information sources can be categorized into primary and secondary sources. Primary refers to
human intelligence, while secondary refers to documentation or archived information.
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3.5.2 Secondary sources
Secondary sources of intelligence are defined as those that are publicly available. 'Publicly
available' means, it is in the 'public domain' and can be accessed by those who make the
effort to do so. Kahaner (1996:78) states that just because some information isn't publicly
absolute and correct information. The latter includes suppliers, distributors, advisers and
customers. Sources that are less direct but also potentially valuable include the staff of
organizations whose role provides them with the opportunity to observe the activities of
competitors. These include analysts, journalists, consultants, trade association staff, the staff
of chambers of commerce and other observers at a national or local level (Kahaner, 1996:53;
Miller, 2000:15; West, 2001:52). Obtaining primary resources should be the ultimate goal of
organizations, but it is not always possible to find them easily (Kahaner, 1996:54).
According to a survey by the Delphi Group, 58% of the useful knowledge of an enterprise is
recorded information and 42% resides in employees' brains (Du Toit, 2003:112).
Unfortunately, information acquisition planning typically does not include human resources.
Human resources have a potential to filter and summarize information, highlight the most
prominent elements, interpret ambiguous aspects, and in general provide richer, more
satisfying communication about an issue (Choo, 1995:30).
Governments do manage to gather information, and certain agencies can prove particularly
fruitful in exploiting such sources (Cook & Cook, 2000:61; Miller, 2000:117).Government
data is considered the primary source of material. Government information collectors usually
obtain the information from the industry itself, often through surveys and questionnaires, and
that information is about as good as is available anywhere. Government filings in regulatory
agencies, for example, are excellent sources of primary information, as are court documents
and records (Kahaner, 1996:54).
Unless the source is deliberately lying, primary sources should be considered absolutely
accurate. Such sources include: Competitors slips of tongue; items the information gatherer
himself observed; things that have been seen at trade shows; as well as photos and unedited
videotapes (Kahaner, 1996:54). According to findings of many researchers, in high value-
added, strategic projects, 80% of the information used is primary internal and external
information sources. In short, if organizations require forward-looking, policy-oriented
competitive intelligence, they should gather primary information.
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3.6 Analysis
The linkage between the raw material (data) and the value added product (intelligence) occurs
when the process of the competitive intelligence cycle has reached the stage of analysis
available doesn't mean that it is private or confidential. All it means is that you must be a
little more persistent and clever to find the information that you want.
Typically, secondary sources are published or held in databases. They include all types of
written publications and online or disk databases. Information written about companies in
directories or in trade association publications, academic papers and theses, newspapers,
magazines, television, and radio as well as analysts' reports about companies should be
considered secondary information. With the exception of published reports, secondary sources
are usually inexpensive to access and are more commonly found than primary information.
The main requirement is time. Most of this information is likely to be unstructured and held
by individuals in their own personal filing systems (Kahaner, 1996:54; West, 2001:51).
Secondary sources also include the background information to support the insights that are
gained from the primary sources. This includes: commercial databases and print publications,
such as analysts' reports, government publications, industry news letters, executives' reports,
executives' speeches, technical reports, and patent reports (Miller, 2000:15).
Secondary sources are not necessarily less important or even less accurate than primary
sources. Secondary sources sometimes are better sources of information than primary sources.
Media personalities and analysts, for instance, can be valuable resources in a research. They
tend to be less biased than other sources and usually have an added value in which they are
quite familiar. These people often see an entire industry and can offer sides the information
gatherer doesn't see (Cook & Cook, 2000:44; Kahaner, 1996:55).
One of the greatest places for finding experts on a particular topic or for following industry
trends is a trade show/exhibition. In such venues organizations can find sales people boasting
about their products, marketing people revealing their upcoming marketing strategies and top
executives speaking about their corporate strategies, successes and failures at keynotes,
seminars or in hospitality suites. Few organizations that are in a position to practice
competitive intelligence tools and techniques properly enjoy their trade show benefit. Most
spend far more time developing their booth, advertising and trying to identify sale leads
(Cook & Cook, 2000:45).
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There are a number of tools and techniques that support the process of competitive
intelligence efforts. The society of Canada (1996) categorized the tools and techniques into
strategic, product-oriented, customer-oriented, financial and behavioural. Each category
therefore, needs to apply different techniques in order to address specific threats and
opportunities. For example, to understand a competitor's financial condition and performance,
to assess how a firm's fmancial practices will affect its ability to grow, to understand the
(Miller, 2000:39). Many researchers believe that this is where 'true' intelligence is created,
that is, where information is converted into 'actionable intelligence' on which strategic and
tactical decisions may be made (Calof et al., 2002, 28). Therefore, to compete effectively,
business needs intelligence. Information or knowledge is no longer sufficient for competing in
the intelligence age (Cook & Cook, 2000:2).
Un1ikemarket research, the analytical process in competitive intelligence is not just a one-
step process that begins once data collection has ceased. To obtain the best intelligence,
analysis and data collection should run hand in hand until a satisfactory result has been
achieved or until it is evident that no further progress can be made (pollard, 1999:136; West,
2001: 115). Therefore, companies should set up a regular competitive intelligence function
that gathers and analyses data on an ongoing basis. If the need should arise to deal with
immediate needs however, 'special projects' can be set up to satisfy end users (Cook & Cook,
2000:156).
One of the main goals of analysis is to forecast what a competitor is likely to do (Kahaner,
1996:103). This is because in the intelligence age, markets are so competitive and so
connected that a technological change or a new entrant in an industry can put organizations
out of business before they know what has happened. Those with successful, proactive
competitive intelligence processes are likely to respond more quickly to such market changes
(Cook & Cook, 2000:117; Du Toit, 2003:113).
In addition to forecasting the future, this phase will also help professionals to identify
significant patterns and trends out of intelligence. In other words, it helps to reveal unique
insights and unforeseen relationships in data. For example, a nation-wide grocery chain
wanted to know what additional type ofitems deli-counter customers usually purchased. After
analysing cash register receipts, the intelligence staff found that they also bought wine. Based
on this finding, headquarters ordered the branch managers to relocate the wine section
adjacent to the deli-counter. As the result their wine sales soared (Miller, 2000:15).
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economic characteristics and financial details of a competitor's business units or product
lines, and to survive and prosper under price competition, financial analysis technique can be
utilized within competitive intelligence.
Although much work has been done in the areas of analysis, there is however, a general
tendency in countries where competitive intelligence practices are still in the developing
phase to make more use of basic analysis tools. In more sophisticated competitive intelligence
environments like North America, Europe and Asia, more advanced analysis techniques are
commonly used (Calof et al., 2002:28). In addition to this, Cook & Cook (2000:26) have
identified that many organizations spend only about 10percent of their time on analysis,
typically because they are unsure of how to do analysis. They suggested that 35 per cent of all
time devoted to a competitive intelligence projects should be spent conducting analysis in
order to turn information into intelligence.
Good intelligence usually results from an effective working relationship between intelligence
users and intelligence gatherers, whether they are an internal department or an external
agency (West, 2001:155). Good analysis also requires a combination of skills that is unique
among business professionals. To use an analogy, when you have people over for a dinner,
you don't give them a bag of groceries to eat. You give them cooked and seasoned food. In
the same manner, you don't give raw data to decision makers. You upgrade it to intelligence,
which includes adding insights, suggestions, and recommendations. To do this upgrading,
successful professionals must have knowledge about the specific industry and about the firm's
current practice and position relative to the topic under consideration. They must understand
the various analytical tools to frame the research (Miller, 2000:59). Kahaner (1996:97) argued
that good analysts do not necessarily have an MBA in the particular area in which they are
involved but have a wide base of experience and knowledge. The author went on by saying
that the most important trait of an analyst is to be able to say: "This I think will happen based
on what I know. This is what it means to the company." To do this, the competitive
intelligence practitioner needs to have personal courage, intellectual fortitude and conviction
to take guesses based on analysed information. Although the presenter may not be able to
know with certainty what a competitor will do, he should be able to articulate several
probable courses of action and their effects.
The value of intelligence depends on its relevance; competence; accuracy; clarity; and
timeliness (Wilson, 1997:20). Kahaner (1996:102) underscores that doing an accurate
assessment requires that professionals put aside their personal biases and preconceived
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Managers frequently want a specific piece of information. A good competitor intelligence
notions and look at each case with an open mind. This doesn't mean that a competitive
intelligence professional can't build theories along the way based on what he sees or what he
knows. It does mean that he must wait until he has solid evidence and a strong logical
argument before he comes to any conclusions. Cook & Cook (2000: 117), however argue that
the business world is not ideal. Waiting for that level of accuracy will result in slow and
ineffective action. Therefore, it is better to be nearly right all the time than to be accurate
occasionally. This idea also received support from West (2001:123) who states that as with all
data, competitive intelligence needs to be accurate to be useful. Unfortunately, by its very
nature competitive intelligence is prone to be inaccurate. This is partly because it is difficult
to obtain complete information but also inaccurate intelligence about competitors' activities
circulates widely in all markets and is often accepted as fact. Therefore, competitive
intelligence practitioners, have to use their own intuition to produce credible intelligence in a
reasonable time frame and to use the best channel to disseminate their findings to the end
users.
3.7 Dissemination
The task of the competitive intelligence professional is not complete until the result of
information that has been collected and processed is communicated effectively to those with
the authority and responsibility as well as other relevant end users to act on the findings
(Calof et al., 2002, 28; Pollard, 1999:184). This is when the competitive intelligence
professional gives management the answers to their questions. What is competitor X likely to
do? How will competitor Y respond to the organization's price increases? When will
competitor Z introduce its new product? This is the time when he presents his logical
arguments based on his analysis of raw data. It is the time to defend his logic (Kahaner,
1996:133).
Effective communication in this regard means consideration of what the personnel are trying
to communicate and how the customer prefers information to be received in terms of channel
and forms (pollard, 1999:184). There are many ways in which important intelligence can be
shared such as written reports, verbal presentations and videos, to name a few. The
effectiveness depends as much on the audience as on the nature of the intelligence itself
(Cook & Cook, 2000:157).
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When presenting their findings, competitive intelligence practitioners should also take note
that the processing and distribution choice will depend on the size of the organization, the
importance attached to the use of competitive intelligence and the budget that is available
(West, 2001: 171). On the other hand, in a small company or organization, one may be the
information-gatherer, analyst and decision-maker, which makes the presentation of findings
very easy. In larger organizations, these roles may be filled by numerous people, all of whom
feel they have a stake in the outcome. It is also possible that the final decision relating to the
competitive intelligence project will be made by a person or people who have not had a
significant role in any aspect of the project and its progress. This makes the presentation all
the more important (Cook & Cook, 2000:157).
Competitor intelligence needs the right people or it will fail. What is needed are people with
good knowledge of the business and with strong communication skills, who are as good with
the board as with the employees. They need to have the courage to tell the truth, diplomacy to
tell the truth tactfully, and determination to keep on telling the truth (pollard, 1999:36).
Moreover, to effectively disseminate and present the findings, practitioners must have a good
grasp of the corporate power structures, the corporate culture, and the mindset of the specific
decision makers to whom they report. Business know-how is a critical asset here (Miller,
professional will find out why this piece of information is wanted and how it will be used.
This knowledge on its part helps the practitioner to choose methods of presentation that will
be appropriate to the end users (pollard, 1999: 161). The best place to start when determining
what method of presentation is desired is to discuss the matter with the decision-makers
themselves. Some may prefer formal research reports, brief outlines of the essential facts, or
both. If they advise practitioners of their preferences and receive the intelligence as requested,
the chance of its being absorbed and acted upon is far greater. Some people are more visually
oriented and prefer a short slide show or graphics outlining the findings in charts or graphs.
Brief memos may be appropriate in another setting, and some managers should receive
findings in one-or-two page intelligence summaries, which provide the recommendations to
be acted upon. Other executives are more interpersonal in nature and may just want an
informal and brief presentation of the findings in person. They may also require professionals
to present their fmdings at staff meetings. Since people absorb intelligence differently,
competitive intelligence professionals should consider the possible delivery options. It might
make the chances of the intelligence being understood and acted upon by the decision-makers
far better (Cook & Cook, 2000: 158; Miller, 2000: 16).
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2000:59). The result must also be clear and focused rather than general. Competitive
intelligence analysts must be prepared to deliver good news and bad news equally, if they
deliver it in the best interest of their company or client. The presentation must identify the
opportunities as well as the threats, and clearly indicate if certain elements of the project or
the question remain uncertain (Cook & Cook, 2000:160).
Many scholars agree that the only true measure of the success of competitive intelligence is
when it influences action in a beneficial way, or when it sensibly supports a decision to do
nothing (Kahaner, 1996:137; Pollard, 1999:183). One of the basic strengths of such benefit is
that it allows organizations to act rather than to react to events that can impact on their firm.
However, a strong recommendation for action based on rock-solid analysis of wholly
verifiable information is worthless if the recommendation is made too late. This is why
competitive intelligence projects must be balanced with expectations, and 'being close' is
better than 'being accurate' in most cases. In other words, competitive intelligence analysts
have to make sure that their findings reach the staff that can use them within an acceptable
time-frame (Cook & Cook, 2000:159; West, 2001:170).
If a strategic change is taking place as the result of competitive analysis, all members of the
organization should be informed. A wider distribution of information promotes more
widespread and more frequent learning, makes the retrieval of relevant information more
likely, and allows new insights to be created by relating disparate items of information.
Companies that build barriers to this information flow, or think that a high-tech
communication technology will substitute for good employee communications, are mistaken.
To encourage users to be active participants, it should be made easy for them to comment on,
evaluate, and redirect the information they have received. If regional and national staff could
communicate about the firm's various initiatives, for example, they might avoid duplicative
efforts, share insights and experiences, and benefit from the expertise of distant colleagues
(Choo, 1995:33; Cook & Cook, 2000:162; Fuld, 1995:419; Miller, 2000:33; West, 2001:
178).
It is obvious that not all information should be open to all stakeholders to communicate. There
is a risk of being exploited by a competitor through what many researchers call counter-
intelligence. Often employees are overlooked in getting an education programs that ensures
their understanding and implications of any information they reveal. Yet they are the front-
line workers who come into regular contact with the people outside the organization. Nothing
prevents competitors from calling a number of people in an organization. It is up to the
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3.8 Tools and techniques for competitive intelligence
Different types of competitive intelligence tools and techniques are available for different
requirements of the purpose of gathering information. But not all these tools and techniques
are suitable for all competitive intelligence objectives; it is up to the competitive intelligence-
unit to use appropriate tools and techniques that are relevant to the specific intelligence needs.
Such determination depends upon various factors such as competitive intelligence needs, time
constraints, financial constraints, staffing limitations etc. For instance, companies who are
facing financial constraints would preferably use government institutions as a source of
information in order to enjoy the advantage of low cost and to get valuable data; while online
databases are chosen to get information at the earliest possible time. Likewise, surveys may
provide a huge amount of data about products and competitors; interviews would be
preferable for gaining a more in-depth perspective from a limited sample; reverse engineering
of competitor's products and services may yield important competitive intelligence
information about quality and costs. This involves dismantling competitors' products in order
to learn their features, the materials that have been used, how they are constructed, the design
of components, finishing and assembly method. Therefore, human judgement is an essential
element of the decision regarding which competitive techniques to set up in a specific
situation (Malhotra, 1996; West, 2001: 106).
employers to ensure that employees know what aspects of the business they should not share
with spouses, neighbours, friends and especially competitors (Cook & Cook, 2000:220).
Counter-intelligence programs represent a partial but essential defense against competitive
intelligence and they should not be confused with counter-espionage. Counter-espionage uses
physical and electronic methods to prevent intruders from gaining access to information.
Counter-intelligence, on the other hand, is subtler and has to be capable of dealing with
intrusions that are neither illegal nor unethical. Counter-intelligence must be placed in
company procedures and in the minds of staff, not across the entry points to sites. The
objective of this method is to restrict information outflows to those which are essential for
them to trade effectively, to protect information until it is too late for competitors to use it
effectively and, just possibly, to confuse competitors by using misinformation programs
(West,2001:184).
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Some competitive intelligence professionals think that a company needs a sophisticated
system for organizing, storing, and disseminating data. This is not true. In most cases, the
simpler is the better (Kahaner, 1996:91). Developing countries in this case can effectively
conduct competitive intelligence using traditional ways to solicit and shelve relevant
information. In addition to that the newly emerged information technology is also suitable as
a tool of accessing and storing information for organizations in developing countries.
......
Malhotra (1996) indicate that the Internet is both an additional source of information and a
cost-effective means of disseminating information to decision-makers. Teo & Choo (2001 :68)
also stress that small- and mid-sized businesses are interested in making use of the Internet to
obtain additional resources. This includes information gathering and intelligence
dissemination. Chen et al (2002) however, are sceptical of the claims made by other
researchers that the Internet has brought about many technical, cognitive, and organizational
challenges. According to their observation, lack of credibility, responsibility and consistency
of the overwhelming amount of information in the Internet is a concern which needs to be
taken into consideration. This is because filtered and relevant information from a reliable
source is the backbone of the third and most important part of competitive intelligence cycle-
analysis.
3.9 Relationship between organizational culture and competitive intelligence practice
Culture plays a large role in how competitive intelligence is practiced. This is true not only of
how companies view intelligence, but how they use it and what aspect they see as important.
Moreover, culture affects how they collect information and, indeed, what they collect
(Kahaner, 1996: 186). A case study conducted by Miller (2000:42) in a vehicular parts
manufacturer shows that culture does affect the intelligence function of an organization.
In order for intelligence to thrive, it typically requires a business culture that understands
competitive intelligence and values the process. Given that the best information for
intelligence purposes comes from within a human network, those organizations that value and
trust employees as a primary source of information, have a greater chance to collect valuable
information. Furthermore, to make intelligence visible an organization requires awareness,
incentives, appropriate systems, and a supportive culture which are the keys to the
intelligence system. Without proper awareness and attitudes that favour both intelligence and
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There are few businesses in which one manager; salesperson, engineer or information
technology (IT) specialist will be able to address adequately all of the intelligence
requirements of an organization. However a team approach is preferable because it serves two
purposes: First, it increases the likelihood that the organization as a whole will embrace the
concept of competitive intelligence; and second, the actual competitive intelligence function
will be more valuable and usable as a result of the input from the team members representing
different strategic needs within the organization (Cook & Cook, 2000:209). Those members
who share similar values, beliefs and norms have a greater chance to engage in team-work.
Cultures can be very stable over time, but they are never static. Crises sometimes force a
group to re-evaluate some values or a set of practices. New challenges can lead to the creation
of new ways of doing things (Kotter & Heskett, 1992:7). The inherent capacity of
organizational intelligence, however, is greater than the sum of the intelligence, information
and knowledge of each individual in that organization that has been ''wired in" to the design
(McMaster, 1996:3). As the result of such deep-rooted values, changing a corporate culture
usually takes three to seven years of hard work. Adjusting people's attitudes and corporate
cultural values requires behavioural modification. An organization needs to confront people
whose actions inhibit the function and recognize those who foster its success (Miller,
2000:38). Miller added that establishing appropriate norms and reinforcements is a process
information sharing, it is difficult to develop intelligence within an organization (Calof &
Viviers, 2001:65-28; Fuld, 1995:424; Miller, 2000:38).
Understanding other organizations or society's culture IS also important for effective
competitive intelligence practice as well as gaining competitive advantage. For instance, one
could encounter difficulties in collecting information as a result of sensitive culture.
Conducting a telephone survey using the methodologies familiar to western culture may not
be effective in other countries (Cook & Cook, 2000:192).
For the intelligence process to benefit a firm significantly, it is believed that managers must
recognize how certain cultural values can support the functioning of a successful intelligence
process. These values include: information sharing, willingness of decision makers to
welcome input from staff, responsiveness to marketplace changes and the willingness to
adjust organizational process to address these changes; as well as behavioural factors, such as
mechanisms to support the gathering and sharing of information, and mechanisms to award
contributors and punish hoarders, which are unique to each firm (Miller, 2000:32).
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3.10 Conclusion
The explosion of information, the pace of technological development and the growth of global
trade mean that today's business environment changes more quickly than ever before. Hence,
managers can no longer depend on feeling or presumption when making strategic business
decisions. In order to face the future with confidence, organizations need to have a tool that
can help them to reduce uncertainty and predict the future. To acquire such a tool at hand,
however, they need to recognize the importance of the competitive intelligence process and
allow individuals and sections of the organization to engage in the process. Intelligence
cannot be realized overnight. It needs to be nurtured in due course along with a favourable
organizational culture. In other words, employees need to have shared values and to be
encouraged to build a sense of trust with each other if they wish to augment the practice of
competitive intelligence.
unique to each firm; one cannot simply copy the actions of another firm, because its setting,
culture, and people are different. The values that support the core aspects of the intelligence
function such as gathering and analysing information, as well as generating and evaluating
intelligence products and services, are therefore embedded within a fundamental set of
corporate culture values that promote a robust and effective firm.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter laid the foundation for the research methodology by means of the
literature study. This chapter gives an outline of the research design, measurement
instruments, pilot test and nature of population.
4.2 Research design
This study looks at actual cases of competitive intelligence actions and selected cultural
dimensions and therefore, according to Mouton (2001 :50) uses "social actions" as unit of
analysis. Therefore, the aim of the "social action" of competitive intelligence is more
qualitative descriptive. However, competitive intelligence is a sensitive issue so that, unless
there is a technique such as survey in place to help candidates express their opinions without
being recognized, it is dif:ficult to collect credible -information and willingness to respond to
the questions. Hence, using primary data, the hypotheses were tested through survey.
The field experiment research of this study was conducted, based on ex post facto correlation
methods. Emory (1980:88) mentioned that most ex post facto designs are used for descriptive
studies in which the researcher seeks to measure such items as the frequency of sociological
characteristics, or the attitude of people. However, ex post facto studies also include attempts
by the researcher to discover causes even when the variable cannot be controlled. This method
is viewed as appropriate to find both the degree of organizational culture and competitive
intelligence practices. The fmdings are then compared to see if there is a correlation between
independent and dependent variables.
Having said that, the physical presence of the researcher on the sites to administer the
questionnaire made its own contribution to enrich the gathering process and increase the
validity of the questionnaire. "The use of a ':field-based' methodology to study Competitive
intelligence is appropriate because it allows the investigator to observe and consequently
capture data about aspects of the competitive intelligence process while ensuring the inclusion
of relevant contextual information that cannot be gleaned from surveys" (Ganesh, Miree, &
Prescott, 2003).
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Based on the number of dimensions identified, this paper, after some adjustments, has
selected six generic cultural dimensions that are focused on sharing information and
motivational aspects of organizational culture. These are: employee involvement; human
resources orientation; organization focus; communication flow; trust; and reward. These
dimensions have been successfully employed in different studies. Van der Post et al. (1998)
for instance, applied culture dimensions such as: employee participation, human resources
orientation, organizational focus, performance orientation, and reward orientation among
others. Rastogi (2000) implemented employee competence, trust, teamwork, communication
processes, motivation, performance expectations and training. Gupta and Govindarajan,
(2000) identified the following characteristics as cultural factors: reward systems, processes,
and people. Denison (1990:43-45) used job reward, peer work facilitation, organization of
work, and communication flow successfully. Weber & Pliskin (1996) executed autonomy in
decision-making, Performance Orientation, and Reward Orientation. The writers of this paper
do not say that these six dimensions are a comprehensive set measure, but somehow represent
the overall make up of organizational culture for this particular study.
The organizational culture questionnaire, therefore, consisted of 23 items that are grouped
according to the above stated six dimensions. The questionnaire used a 5-point Likert scale.
The scale ranged from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). In between these two
4.3 Measurement instruments
A questionnaire (Appendix) was used during the course of this study to measure the level of
organizational culture and competitive intelligence.
In general, the questionnaire comprises items related both to competitive intelligence practice
and organizational culture, and questions regarding respondents' demographic details as well
as information about the sources and time spent on the process of competitive intelligence.
Regarding competitive intelligence practice, the questions covered four areas of the
intelligence cycle: planning and focus, gathering the information, analysing the information,
and communicating the intelligence. To determine the level of each firm's organizational
culture, on the other hand, an instrument that can yield concrete results was needed. The
literature survey revealed that organizational culture dimensions have been used successfully
by other researchers. Van der Post et al. (1998:31) for instance, identified 15 dimensions that
emerged through a consensus of a panel consisting of human resources experts. The reliability
coefficients of the dimensions varied between 0.788 and 0.932, which according to Huysamen
(1983:27) is highly significant.
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4.5 Population
A population, which was comprised mainly of top managers, was randomly selected from the
database of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Eritrea Chamber of Commerce
directory with the aim of representing the target group, which eventually allowed generalizing
across manufacturers and traders. This means one questionnaire was administered to a single
manager of each organization. The survey was conducted during September and October
extreme points, disagree (2), uncertain (3) and agree (4) were placed to measure respondents'
views about their respective organizations. A score above 3 thus indicates that respondents
agree with the answer, while a score below 3 indicates non-agreement. The score, however, is
not intended only to measure the level of competitive intelligence practice and the strength of
organizational culture. Rather, it helped to determine whether or not there was a positive
relationship (correlation) between independent and dependent variables (Organizational
Culture and Competitive Intelligence respectively) regardless of the magnitude of the average
result.
4.4 Pilot test
The questionnaire was pre-tested in preliminary interviews with five top managers of different
sectors. This preliminary assessment of the questionnaire was conducted in order to minimize
the common source of errors indicated by Mouton (2001:103) such as no piloting, ambiguous
or vague items, double-barrelled questions; item order effects, fictitious constructs and
leading questions. The goal of these precautions is to verify if respondents clearly understand
the statement in the questionnaire. In addition to that, the interviews were used to review all
questions for relevance and wording. This process was undertaken to ensure clarity and
relevance and helped in understanding the constructs of the variables to be included in the
questionnaire.
During this pilot testing, a few problems were examined, including the understanding of
concepts and procedural difficulties improvements were then made according to the
instructions. Copies of the final questionnaire were handed personally by the researcher to the
targeted managers of 39 organizations. A follow-up visit was also made one week later to
non-responding firms.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
2003. All respondents were requested to participate voluntarily without financial or other
benefits.
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CHAPTER FIVE
MAJOR FINDINGS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter reports the findings of the data analyses and it is organized into the following
subsections. First the response rate of the demographic detail is presented. Next, a breakdown
percentage of competitive intelligence time is displayed. Thereafter, the research instrument
was assessed for reliability. Finally, the research hypotheses were empirically correlated and
analysed.
5.2 Characteristics of the respondents
The first section of the questionnaire had the objective of obtaining biographical information
from the respondents. Of the 39 questionnaires handed out, responses were received from 24,
yielding a response rate of 62 percent. One of them was rejected due to incompleteness. This
means a sample of 23 individuals formed part of this research study. An analysis was then
done to determine the characteristics of this sample groups. These biographical details
include: Applicability of the sector, years of operation, number of employees, educational
background of the respondent, position held in the current organization, ownership of the
sector, and total years of employment/ownership of the sector.
5.2.1Sector applicability
As shown in figure 5.1 almost three quarters (74%) of the respondents were from the
manufacturing sector. Only 26% of trading firms could manage to complete the questionnaire
and become part of this study.
Figure 5.1: Sector applicable in the sample group
26%
• Manufacture ~Trade
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52%
5.2.2 Years of operation
Figure 5.2 shows that the majority (52%) of the undertakings have been in operation for more
than twenty years. Around one third (30%) of them are newly emerged organizations (5 years
and less). Those firms that have been in operation from 6 to 10 as well as 11 to 20 years
comprised a ratio of 18% of the total responses.
Figure 5.2: Years of operation
30% 9% 9%
.>20
5.2.3 Number of employees
In the figure 5.3 below the researcher shows that the majority of the sample group (66%) had
more than 50 employees in their organizations. Only 4% recruited less than 10 employees to
run their business. The rest (30%) had between 11 and 50 employees.
ae to 10 DU11 to 20
Figure 5.3: number of employees in each sample organizations
4% 30% o
la 11 to 50 nDJ>50
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5.2.4 Educational background
Figure 5.4 shows that large number (65%) of individuals in the sample group had BA degrees.
Only 9% did not have qualifications beyond high school level. The rest of the population had
educational qualifications of either diplomas (13%) or MA degrees (13%).
Figure 5.4: Educational background of respondents
• Hi h-school ~ Di lorna DIlBA de ree • MA De
9% 13% 65% 13%
5.2.5 Position held
In figure 5.5 the finding indicates that almost half (48%) of respondents held the position of
senior manager, whilst 35% were directors and the rest (17%) were individuals appointed as
group managers.
Figure 5.5: Position held by respondents
48% 35%
• Senior-mana er ~ Director DIlGrou er
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5.2.6 Ownership of the undertakings
er
Figure 5.6: Respondent's ownership status of the sample organizations
22%
I11IIIOwner-mana er ~Em
Figure 5.6 show that 78% of the respondents were employee-managers. The rest (22%) were
managers who owned the organizations.
5.2.7 Years of experience in the enterprises
Respondents were distributed amongst all four categories of working experience in the sample
organizations, as displayed in figure 5.7. The majority of the respondent (52%) had worked
for the organization for less than five years. Only 13% had stayed for more than 20 years.
Another 13% had between 11 and 20 years' working experience. The rest (22%) indicated
that they had between 6 and 10 years' experience in that particular organization.
Figure 5. 7: Individuals' years experience in the current job of the sample organizations
13%52% 22% 13%
.0 to 5 ~6 to 10 IIID11 to 20 .>20
In summary, Figures 5.1-5.7 indicate that the majority of the respondents were from the
manufacturing sector and the organizations have been operating for more than 20 years. Most
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of the respondents were semor managers with BA degrees and higher educational
qualifications who had worked for less than five years and did not own the organization.
5.3 Allocation of time and resources
5.3.1 Time allocated for competitive intelligence tasks
Figure 5.8 shows that firms of the sample organizations spent one-third (33%) of the total
competitive intelligence time in gathering information, 28% in planning and focus, 22% in
analysing the information, and 17% communicating the intelligence to end users.
Figure 5.8: Competitive intelligence time spent in the cycle
EilJ Planning & Focus
• Analysing information
• gathering Information
m Communicating intelligence
5.3.2 Time spent on stakeholders
The sample organizations spend much intelligence time (37%) on dealing with customers.
Figure 5.9: Competitive intelligence time spent in stakeholders
EilJ competitors
• Government Institutions
III Partners
.customers
IIIISupplyers
A A
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m people inside organization
• electronic information
mother
• people outside organization
IDpublished information
This is followed by competitors (21%), suppliers (15%), government institutions (15%), and
partners (9%) as shown in figure 5.9.
5.3.3 Sources and amount of information
Figure 5.10 indicates that people inside organizations (37%) were the mam source of
information for the sample firms. Twenty-nine percent of information, on the other hand,
came from people outside the organizations. While published materials contributed 19%, only
12% of the overall information gathered for the purpose of competitive intelligence practice
came from electronic sources. The respondents mentioned that 3% of the information
emanated from other sources.
Figure 5.10: Information gathered from various sources
12%
In summary, much of the time allocated within the competitive intelligence cycle as depicted
in figure 5.8 was on the phase of gathering and planning. Figure 5.9, on the other hand,
indicated that organizations of the sample population involve more with customers and
competitors. People from within and outside the respective organizations were the main
source of information for the firms, as shown in figure 5.10.
5.4 Reliability of measuring instruments
Using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) programme, the Cronbach Alpha
Correlation Coefficient was utilized to calculate the reliability of the measuring instruments.
This correlation coefficient reflects the degree of internal consistency of a test. According to
the programme's user guide, Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha is based on the average
correlation of items within a test, if those terms are standardized. If the items are not
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5.4.2 Reliability of competitive intelligence components
The fmding of table 5.2 indicates that a Cronbach Alpha value of between 0.5005 and 0.8815
was obtained for the questionnaire of competitive intelligence. Although this value is not as
high as dimensions of organizational culture, it is greater than 0.5 and therefore it was indeed
measuring the variable Competitive intelligence.
standardized, it is based on the average co-variation among items.
The value of Cronbach Alpha Correlation Coefficient varies between 0 and 1. The closer the
value is to 1, the more consistent the measurement and thus the more reliable the test; the
closer the value is to 0, the less reliable the test. A Cronbach Alpha Correlation Coefficient of
0.5 is regarded as statistically significant (Huysamen, 1983 :32). The Alpha Coefficient of the
items in the questionnaire is presented in the following tables.
5.4.1 Reliability of organizational culture dimensions
Table 5.1 shows that the Cronbach Alpha values are very high for all dimensions, varying
between 0.8815 and 0.9917.
Tablei.I: Reliability of organizational culture dimensions
Dimension** Cronbach Alpha Value
Employee involvement .9917*
Human Resources Orientation .8889*
Organization Focus .9433*
Communication Flow .8815*
(*StatIstIcally significant; Cronbach Alpha> 0.5)
(** note that the dimensions 'Reward' and 'Trust' each consists of two items and therefore the Cronbach Alpha
Coefficient was not calculated.)
The items within each of the dimensions of the organizational culture were therefore testing
the specific dimensions that it was supposed to test. The conclusion can thus be drawn that the
questionnaire is a reliable measuring instrument for the testing of the organizational culture.
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Table 5.2: Reliability of components of competitive intelligence
Dimension Cronbach Alpha Value
Planning and focus .7423*
Gathering the information .5535*
Analysing the information .5005*
Communicating the intelligence .8815*
(*StatJ.sucally significant; Cronbach Alpha> 0.5)
5.5 Strength of organizational culture and competitive intelligence performance
With the information collected from the survey, a cultural and competitive intelligence
strength index was constructed by computing the average response of each firm. According to
this study, those firms that scored an average point between three and four were considered as
having a culture of moderate strength, those with above four were considered as having a
strong culture, while those below the average (three) were taken as weak. Table 5.3 shows
each company's average scores of organizational culture and competitive intelligence.
According to this, 14 (61%) of the 23 firms had moderate organizational culture, 2 (9%)
strong culture, and the rest 7 (30%) showed weak culture.
Similarly, a low average score (below three) on each company indicates that little or no
competitive intelligence activities were carried out, whilst a high score represents relatively
extensive activities conducted by the organization. Table 5.3 shows that five companies
(Mcm1, Ima8, Brr12, Atx16, and Brc21), which comprises 22% of the 23 firms, scored below
average and categorized as poor performers. The rest (78%) were good performers in the
informal competitive intelligence cycle, according to the findings. This indicates that Eritrean
traders and manufacturers were doing well in terms of informal competitive intelligence
practice. Thus, hypothesis 1, which says "unfavourable organizational culture impacts
negatively on the practice of competitive intelligence by Eritrean manufacturers and traders"
was not supported. In this study the label of performance is meant to imply relatively. That is,
someorganizations may not perform particularly well by universal standards, but taken within
their context, they clearly outperformed the average or norm for that particular country.
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On the other hand, the strength/weakness of organizational culture was evaluated in terms of
the six dimensions selected for this study. As a result, all the sample firms scored relatively
well in dimensions such as employee involvement (questions 15.1-15.4, with average score of
3.29), organizational focus (questions: 17.1-17.5, scored 3.64), reward (questions: 19.1 &
19.2, scored 3.41), and trust (questions: 20.1 & 20.2, scored 3.74) as depicted in table 5.4. The
companies however indicated that there were weakness regarding human resources
orientation (2.64- average result) such as employees' ignorance of competitive intelligence
Table 5.3: Each company's average scores of organizational culture and
competitive intelligence
Companies Average score of organizational culture Average score of competitive intelligence
Atxl6 2.13 2.5
Sbrl4 2.45 3.04
Brc21 2.63 2.53
Irna8 2.63 2.74
1ns7 2.79 3.06
K099 2.91 3.24
Brrl2 2.98 2.79
Mcm1 3 2.13
Brkll 3.02 3.33
Mtc13 3.2 3.65
Msl3 3.23 3.32
EKG18 3.42 3.53
EKF5 3.45 3.5
Cocl9 3.49 3.88
Agcl7 3.58 3.52
Frh23 3.64 3.62
Ans10 3.73 3.81
KBT6 3.77 3.74
Snf15 3.81 3.79
Soa20 3.83 4.5
Ngd2 3.99 4
Afw22 4.07 3.95
Rth4 4.12 4.23
In general, the findings revealed that Eritrean firms are weak in maintaining a central record
of reliable sources of information (question 12.9 [appendix]: with average result score of
2.87), formal training on how to collect information (question 12.11: 2.26), classify the source
(question 12.12: 2.74), and conducting an intelligence audit (question 12.13: 2.83). Moreover,
the majority were not in a position to prepare profiles of their competitors regularly (question
13.1: 2.61), implement formal psychological models such as competitor management
profiling (question 13.9: 2.39), and protect themselves against threat through counter-
intelligence (question 13.10: 2.52).
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(question 16.1: 2.65), lack of training in competitive intelligence (question 16.2: 2.3) and
specifically on counter-intelligence (question 16.3: 2.35). Furthermore, communication flow
(2.94-average result) such as the lack of internal printed publications (question 18.3: 2.26),
and the unavailability of internal electronic platform (intranet), which are essential to
encourage employees to exchange information (question 18.4: 2.13) were identified as
bottlenecks to the flow of information within organizations.
Table 5.4: Average score of organizational culture dimensions
Dimensions Average score
Human Resources Orientation 2.64
Employee involvement 3.29
Organization focus 3.64
Communication flow 2.94
Reward 3.41
Trust 3.74
5.6 The relationship between organizational culture and competitive intelligence in the
sample organizations
A more widely used measure of the degree of association between two variables is the
correlation coefficient. It is a unit-free measure of the strength and the direction of a linear
relationship between two variables (Watsham & Parramore, 1997:66). In this study the
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient (r) was implemented to measure the linear
relationship between organizational culture and competitive intelligence. "In Pearson Product-
Moment Correlation Coefficient, variables X and Y are related in a linear fashion. In this case
X and Y are correlated if pXY~. If pXY=O, Y and X are said to be uncorrelated" (Bailey,
1971:551). The following is Pearson's Correlation Coefficient formula:
Where X = variable A, Y= variable B, and n= number of paired observations.
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For instance, to find out the correlation between organizational culture and competitive
intelligence of manufacturing companies in the sample population, the calculation was as
follows:
Table 5.5 shows the average scores of organizational culture and competitive intelligence of
manufacturing companies. An index was computed by summing the scores to produce these
averages. In order to establish what the relationship is, a Pearson correlation coefficient was
computed between each organizational culture dimension's average scores and the
competitive intelligence practice average scores.
Table 5.5: Average scores of organizational culture and competitive
intelligence of manufacturing companies
Organizational Competitive
Companies Culture Intelligence
Code (X) (Y) XY JC y2
Mc1 3 2.13 6.39 9 4.5369
Ms3 3.23 3.32 10.7236 10.4329 11.0224
Rth4 4.12 4.23 17.4276 16.9744 17.8929
EKF5 3.45 3.5 12.075 11.9025 12.25
KBT6 3.77 3.74 14.0998 14.2129 13.9876
!ma8 2.63 2.74 7.2062 6.9169 7.5076
Brr12 2.98 2.79 8.3142 8.8804 7.7841
Mte13 3.2 3.65 11.68 10.24 13.3225
Sbr14 2.45 3.04 7.448 6.0025 9.2416
Snf15 3.81 3.79 14.4399 14.5161 14.3641
Atx16 2.13 2.5 5.325 4.5369 6.25
EKG18 3.42 3.53 12.0726 11.6964 12.4609
Coc19 3.49 3.88 13.5412 12.1801 15.0544
Soa20 3.83 4.5 17.235 14.6689 20.25
Bre21 2.63 2.53 6.6539 6.9169 6.4009
Afw22 4.07 3.96 16.1172 16.5649 15.6816
Frh23 3.64 3.62 13.1768 13.2496 13.1044
TOTAL I;X= 55.85 I;Y= 57.45 m=193.926 I;X' =188.8923 I;Y' = 201.1119
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r=r========1=7(=19=3=.9=26=)=-~(5r5=.8=5)=(5=7.=45=)========
~17(188.89230 - (55.85)2 ~17(201.1119) - (57.45)2
r = 0.8449398
t-Critical (degree of freedom = n-2 = 17-2 = 15) at five percent of significance, i.e. a = 0.05 ,
then t 0.05(15) = 2.131451
The t-calculated value is
0.8449398= --;=======
1- (0.8449398)2
17 -2
= 6.118291
Since t-calculated = 6.118291 is greater than t-critical = 2.131451, we conclude that there is a
high relationship between organizational culture and competitive intelligence in the case of
manufacturing companies. Field (2004) says "if the value of the correlation coefficient is
greater than the positive value of the critical rho value for a one-tailed test, then the
correlation is positive, using a 5% level of significance".
Similarly, the correlation between organizational culture and competitive intelligence of both
trade and manufacturing sectors was computed using the SPSS package to determine their
relationship as it is depicted in the table below (5.6). The results indicate that there was a high
correlation (0.974) in the field of the trading sector between independent and dependent
variables. A high correlation (0.845) is displayed for the manufacturing industry in the same
table. The overall result of traders and manufacturers in the sample population was also
correlated as a high degree (0.851). Acasta (2004) indicated that the level of correlations is
stated according to the following margins: 0.9 to 1 very high correlation; 0.7 to 0.9 high
correlation; 0.5 to 0.7 moderate correlation, 0.3 to 0.5 low correlation; and 0.0 to 0.3 little if
any correlation. In general, there was a high positive correlation between the variation of
organizational culture and the variation of competitive intelligence. In other words, firms with
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Another way to examine the relationship between organizational culture and competitive
intelligence of the sample organizations is to look at the correlations between the six selected
dimensions of organizational culture (employee involvement, human resources,
organizational focus, communication flow, reward, and trust) and competitive intelligence as
a single entity. The result obtained from this correlation is summarized in figure 5.11.
This figure displayed that there was a low correlation (0.486) between employee involvement
and competitive intelligence. On the other hand dimensions such as human resources (0.682),
higher levels of cultural strength performed better than those with a comparably weak culture.
Table 5.6: Correlations between organizational culture and competitive intelligence
in each of the trading and manufacturing sectors in the sample population
Sectors Pearson's Correlation Coefficient
Manufacturers onl y .845**
Traders only .974**
The whole sample .851**
**.CorrelatlOo IS significant at the O.Ollevel (l-tailed),
5.7 Relationship between competitive intelligence and dimensions of organizational
culture
Table 5.7 contains a list of the abbreviated items used in figure 5.11.
Table 5.7: List of the abbreviated items
Abbreviation Meaning
Com Int Competitive Intelligence
Emp Inv Employee Involvement
HmnRs Human resources
OrgFc Organizational Focus
ComFI Communication Flow
Rwd Reward
Trs Trust
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Correlations
reward (0.662) and trust (0.696) were moderately correlated. Communication flow (0.755)
and organizational focus (0.826) were highly correlated with the competitive intelligence
practice of the sample organizations. All the correlations were significant at the 0.01 level (1-
tailed). "One-tailed tests should be used when there is a specific predicted direction to the
hypothesis being tested" (Field, 2004). A positive correlation between organizational culture
and competitive intelligence is the predicted direction of this study.
Figure 5.11: Correlations between six dimensions of organizational
culture and competitive intelligence
Hmn Com
Com Int Epllnv Rs Org Fc FI Rwd Trs
Com Int Pearson Corr 1 .486 .... .682 .... .826 .... .755 .... .662 .... .696 ....
Sig. (1-tailed) .009 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Epllnv Pearson Corr .486 .... 1 .541 .... .404" .703 .... .291 .401"
Sig. (1-tailed) .009 .004 .028 .000 .089 .029
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
HmnRs Pearson Corr .682'" .541 .... 1 .665 .... .588 .... .604 .... .696 ....
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .004 .000 .002 .001 .000
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Org Fc Pearson Corr .826'" .404" .665 .... 1 .648 .... .581 .... .772 ....
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .028 .000 .000 .002 .000
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
ComFI Pearson Corr .755 .... .703 .... .588 .... .648 .... 1 .645** .544"*
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .004
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Rwd Pearson Corr .662*" .291 .604"* .581*" .645 .... 1 .505 ....
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .089 .001 .002 .000 .007
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Trs Pearson Corr .696 .... .401' .696 .... .772 .... .544*" .505*" 1
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .029 .000 .000 .004 .007
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
..... Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
'. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (Hailed).
5.8 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to report and to provide a summary of the results achieved in
this study. According to the data collected, the majority of the sample organizations
performed well in their competitive intelligence practice. Moreover, the result indicated that
there was a significant correlation between organizational culture and competitive intelligence
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practice. This shows strong support for the predicted hypothesis of this study that there is a
positive relationship between the independent and dependent variables. But, the hypothesis
that unfavourable organizational culture impacts negatively on the practice of competitive
intelligence by Eritrean manufacturers and traders was not supported as it was put-forth.
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6.3 Allocation of time and resources
CHAPTERSIX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Introduction
This study investigated the relationship between organizational culture and competitive
intelligence using a reliable measuring instrument. The research also attempted to investigate
the strength of these two variables by comparing each sample's average score as well as by
means of correlation between the six dimensions of organizational culture and the practice of
competitive intelligence as, a whole. Given the results of this study as presented in the
preceding chapter, the following conclusions are made:
6.2 Demographic makeup
The majority of the respondents were sernor employee managers with high educational
qualifications. It is believed that the high hierarchical level of respondents enhanced the
validity of the result of this study since they are more likely to be familiar with organizations'
overall activities.
According to the finding, respondents spend most of their time in the gathering and planning
phases of the competitive intelligence cycle. When we look at the high percentage of the score
on gathering, one can say that Eritrean manufacturers and traders are exposing themselves to
information overload. As the literature review of this study made clear, organizations that
have a notion of "gathering all information they get" will fail in addressing the need of end
users for actionable intelligence. Many researchers believe that analysis, which is the most
important part of the competitive intelligence process, should be allocated a larger percentage
of time in the process of competitive intelligence. If we study the result of the sample
enterprises of this paper, however, only 22% of the total time was allocated to analysis.
Although these figures are almost similar to results identified in the literature on competitive
intelligence, Cook & Cook (2000:26) suggest that around 35% of the entire time devoted to
competitive intelligence should be spent doing analysis.
On the other hand, the majority of the firms had informal intelligence focusing mainly on
customers and competitors. The findings revealed that government institutions, which are
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6.5 Relationship between competitive intelligence and dimensions of organizational
culture
Except for the employee involvement, which showed a low correlation, the Pearson Product
Moment Correlation Coefficient indicated that all the dimensions were significantly
believed to be sources of low-cost and valuable data, were not preferential partners to the
companies when it comes to competitive intelligence.
The most valuable source of information to the majority of the respondents was people from
within and outside the enterprises. Here, using people as a main source of information can be
seen as positive trend. It is positive because, first it is primary information and rich in content;
and second the involvement of people in the giving and receiving of information is the core
element for the creation of knowledge and intelligence. However, equally important
information sources such as published materials and electronic information were not widely
exploited by the companies to enhance their information repository.
6.4 Strength of organizational culture and competitive intelligence performance
The findings showed that the majority of the respondents had a culture of moderate strength.
Only 30% of the enterprises demonstrated that they lack strong organizational culture. On the
side of the six organizational dimensions, the results identified that human resources
orientation and communication flow were the weakest dimensions in all sample firms. This
suggested that the enterprises lack skilled manpower who can understand the overall activities
of the competitive intelligence process. Similarly, the finding hinted at the fact that
departments and individuals of those organizations lack a medium with which to share
information among each other. On the positive side, it entails that at the organizational level
there is a positive attitude towards the importance of competitive intelligence. There is trust
and a willingness to participate at employees' level as well.
Except for a few (22%), the majority of Eritrean undertakings performed informal competitive
intelligence well according to the findings. In other words, there is a positive attitude and
willingness in place for competitive intelligence practice in the Eritrean context if initiatives
are taken to make competitive intelligence formal and systematic. Thus, hypothesis 1, which
stated that unfavourable organizational culture impacts negatively on the practice of
competitive intelligence by Eritrean manufacturers and traders, was not supported.
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Government institutions, on the other hand not only have to open their door to provide
correlated. Hence, the anticipated sub-hypotheses that there is a significant relationship
between employment involvement and competitive intelligence were not supported. This
means that managers might not wish to leave employees alone to conduct the task of
competitive intelligence. Instead, they may think that it is more effective if there is an
intervention of others such as the managers themselves to move employees forward to
participate in the process.
The positive significant result of the other five dimensions on the other hand, supported the
predicted hypothesis. The empirical result asserted that there is a positive relationship
between the selected dimensions of organizational culture and competitive intelligence
practice. These findings are also consistent with those of other studies, which found that
organizational culture can be related to improved performance.
6.6 Recommendations
Based on the fmdings and conclusions, the following recommendations can be made:
6.6.1 Time allocation
In our contemporary world, knowing when to stop gathering information is just as important
as how to get that information. Unsystematic ways of collecting information always lead to
information overload. Although one might have important information at hand, if that
information is not found and implemented when needed, it is useless. In the light of this,
Eritrean firms have to allocate more time to the phase of analyses in the cycle of competitive
intelligence, and be focused when they collect information. It is through analysis that
information or knowledge transforms into intelligence.
6.6.2 Government institutions as resources of information
The finding indicated that Eritrean organizations were not in a position fully to exploit
government institutions as resources of competitive intelligence information. Many writers
agree that despite a seemingly worldwide reputation for inefficiency and frustrating
bureaucracy, government offices do manage to collect information properly and effectively.
Hence, traders and entrepreneurs should exert an effort to dig out valuable data from the
government's information repository.
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6.6.5 Information sharing
In order for the system of competitive intelligence to work, information must be shared
among individuals and departments within an organization. As part of their normal work,
employees usually receive or exposed to a daily stream of information about people and
events. Firms therefore, should arrange a platform of communication and encourage their
information, but should also use their influential power to take initiatives to promote the
implementation of formal and systematic competitive intelligence practice in Eritrea. Calof &
Viviers (2001 :66) state that governments in general have four primary assets, such as outreach
potential to reach different companies, skilled employees, vast information, and financial
resources which can be used to enhance competitive intelligence. This potential can be used
to develop the following three competitive intelligence roles: building awareness, developing
competitive intelligence resources through training and fmancial support, and enhancing their
information product through the wealth of information that exists within the government
database.
6.6.3 Secondary information resources
We have learned from the literature review that secondary resources of information such as
published materials and electronic information are equally important as primary resources.
Due to the advent of advanced electronic media, nowadays, the accessibility and availability
of such information is simplified in an unprecedented manner. Moreover, secondary sources
are cheaper when it comes to collecting information. Therefore, one can safely recommend
that Eritrean entrepreneurs should explore printed and electronic media such as Internet to
collect a wealth of information and to have interconnection with the globalized world at prices
they can afford.
6.6.4 Human resources
It is futile attempt to take initiatives to set formal competitive intelligence without having
employees who understand its importance. Organizations therefore, must train their personnel
how to exploit opportunities and defend against threat (counter intelligence), if they wish to
create a competitive edge.
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people to allow others to have access to any information that comes into their unit. Unless
there is an open system for the free flow of information in place, it is difficult to 'arm' an
organization with the power of competitive intelligence.
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2 = Disagree
3 = Uncertain
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
APPENDIX: Questionnaire and total score
Instructions
The responses to this survey will be used exclusively for the purposes of primary research by
an Eritrean postgraduate student working towards an MPhil in information and knowledge
management study at the University of Stell enbosch, South Africa. None of the information
being sought is intended to identify an individual/organization by person and all data gathered
will be kept in strict confidence.
Section A: Demographic details:
Please mark the appropriate box with a cross (x):
I Sector Applicable Manufacture Trade Other
17 6
Percent 74 26
2 Year of operation 0-5 6 to lO II to 20 >20
7 2 2 12
Percent 30 9 9 52
3 Number of employees < lO II to 50 >50
I 7 15
Percent 4 30 66
High- BA MA
7 Educational background Elementary school Diploma Degree Degree
2 3 15 3
Percent 9 13 65 13
Senior- Group
8 What position do you hold? manager Director Manager Other
11 8 4
Percent 48 35 17
Own& Employee-
9 Ownership of the sector manager manager Other
5 18
Percent 22 78
For how long have you been
lO an employee/owner of this sector? o to 5 6 to lO II to 20 >20 other
12 5 3 3
Percent 52 22 13 13
Section B: Competitive intelligence practices
Please indicate to what degree you agree with the following statements.
Use the following key: 1 Strongly disagree
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12: Gathering the information
11: Planning and focus
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 Aver~
We plan ahead of the time to identify
11.1 the type of information we need. 0 4 6 52 30 4.00
We explicitly define why the
information is needed and how it will
11.2 be used. 0 6 9 40 35 3.91
The goals of our needs are specific
1l.3 and non amorphous 0 2 15 32 45 4.09
We proactively communicate the
company's intelligence needs to
11.4 employees I 8 12 36 25 3.57
We have convenient ways for
employees to
11.5 report observations & information I 6 12 48 15 3.57
We regularly discuss to identify
11.6 our intelligence requirements 0 12 6 32 35 3.70
Weare concerned to understand the
plans and intentions of not only our
key competitors but also of key allies
and partners, such as suppliers,
distributors, investors and
11.7 collaborators. 0 4 9 32 50 4.13
Total Average 3.85
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 Averllg_e
We gather information on regular
12.1 bases. 2 10 9 20 40 3.52
Gathering reliable information help
12.2 us to stay ahead of our competitors. 0 2 6 36 55 4.30
Our contacts outside the organisation
and staff are our most important
12.3 sources of information. 0 4 15 24 50 4.04
We use legal as well as relevant
12.4 collection methods. 0 8 18 36 20 3.57
All information collected is checked
for accuracy and validated by at least
12.5 one other source. 0 12 6 52 10 3.48
We train our employees every time
they go to trade shows, exhibitions,
conventions, and so forth about what
type of information they should look
12.6 for. 4 8 18 20 20 3.04
Results from exit interviews/job
interviews are used in our
12.7 intelligence system. 2 16 9 28 15 3.04
We only try to collect available
information on our competitors that
are relevant to the intelligence
objectives (we focus on those issues
12.8 of highest importance). 1 10 15 36 15 3.35
Our company maintains a central
12.9 record of reliable sources of 2 14 24 16 10 2.87
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information.
We conduct intelligence projects
regardless of whether we have been
12.10 asked to do it. 0 14 15 36 10 3.26
Our employees have received formal
training on how to collect
information (e.g. an internet
searching course or an interviewing
12.11 course). 5 18 21 8 0 2.26
After collecting information whether
it is from a person or from a
documented source (e.g. the internet)
12.12 we classify the source. 2 16 24 16 5 2.74
We conduct an intelligence audit
(identify and catalogue information
already exists within a firm such as
what people know, what reports they
12.13 have, publications, etc)_. 2 16 21 16 10 2.83
We use mainly secondary sources of
information (public literature,
analysts' reports, newspapers,
libraries, databases, consultant
reports, government reports, etc.) to
12.14 learn about our key competitors. 1 16 12 40 0 3.00
The following tools and techniques
are effective in gathering
12.15 information?
12.15.1 Online databases 2 6 24 24 20 3.30
12.15.2 Interview 1 4 24 36 15 3.48
12.15.3 Observation of competitors sites 0 2 18 52 15 3.78
Reverse engineering of competitor's
12.15.4 products and services 2 10 27 24 5 2.96
12.15.5 Trade fair and Exhibition 1 12 3 48 15 3.43
12.15.6 workshops 1 8 12 44 15 3.48
The following information sources
12.16 are easy to access
competitors 3 16 9 36 2.7812.16.1
suppliers 10 15 52 3.3512.16.2
customers 10 12 56 3.3912.16.3
public offices (government offices) 2 20 6 36 2.7812.16.4
Internet is effective 10 providing
12.17 relevant information 1 2 15 40 30 3.83
Print media is effective in providing
12.18 relevant information 0 2 24 44 15 3.70
people are effective in providing
12.19 relevant information 0 0 18 56 15 3.87
government representatives (e.g.
embassies) abroad are effective in
12.20 providing relevant information 0 12 18 36 10 3.30
Trade fair/exhibition and meetings
are important in providing relevant
12.21 information 1 0 12 52 25 3.91
We use mainly primary sources of
information (people who are in a
position to provide intelligence) to
12.22 learn about our key competitors. 1 10 24 32 5 3.13
Total Average 3.12
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13: Analysing the information
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 Averag_e
Our company regularly prepares
13.1 profiles of our competitors. 2 22 15 16 5 2.61
Our competitive intelligence
capability is a strategic management
13.2 tool and serves the decision makers. 1 6 21 44 5 3.35
The intensity of competition in our
market / industry (home country) is
13.3 high. 4 8 15 36 5 2.96
Our market share in our home
13.4 country's market / industry is high 0 2 0 48 50 4.35
Our company continuously and
systematically monitors our
technologies globally to determine
whether new competitors or
13.5 technology substitutes are emerging. 0 6 12 48 20 3.74
We monitor and assess the activities
and plans of organisations and groups
(such as regulatory agencies or
NGOs) whose view of our company
13.6 could affect us. 1 12 15 32 15 3.26
Our company produces assessments
that address several possible
outcomes of our competitors' actions
and that identify the threats and
opportunities those outcomes present
13.7 for our company. 1 12 21 24 15 3.17
Our company analyses our
competitors' plans and strategies to
13.8 predict and anticipate their actions. 2 14 9 36 10 3.09
Our company uses formal
psychological models such as
13.9 competitor management profiling. 5 16 21 8 5 2.39
Our Cl activities specifically include
counter-intelligence, aimed at
assessing the success of Cl efforts
13.10 directed against us. 4 18 15 16 5 2.52
The results from our intelligence
process influence our strategy and
13.11 direction. 1 14 12 24 25 3.30
We believe that competitive
intelligence can be used to create a
13.12 competitive advantage. 0 0 3 68 25 4.17
We have a long-term competitive
13.13 intelligence plan. 2 16 9 28 15 3.04
Our company is proactive against
13.14 outside threats. 0 8 21 32 20 3.52
Our company maintains a network of
human contacts outside the company
that we call on to answer senior
management's questions in a timely
13.15 and credible fashion. 1 10 33 16 10 3.04
Our company identifies who its
13.16 customers and market segment are. 0 2 6 52 35 4.13
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15: Employee involvement
We properly scan external
environment to meet or exceed
customer's expectations regarding to
product quality, service quality and
price as defined by customers, not by
13.17 the firm itself 1 6 18 40 15 3.48
We regularly identify our Core
competence (capabilities, skills, and
technology) to create low cost or
13.18 differentiated customer value. 0 4 12 52 20 3.83
Our company monitor the
characteristics of the societal context
13.19 in which the organization exists. 0 6 24 40 10 3.48
Total Average 3.34
14: Communicating the intelligence
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 Average
Our employees regularly report
information about our competitors to
14.1 appropriate managers. 0 14 12 40 10 3.30
Senior managers use Cl regularly in
14.2 their planning and decision-making. 0 16 12 44 0 3.13
Our staffs distribute intelligence
findings only to those who are
14.3 authorised to see them. 0 14 21 36 0 3.09
Key decision-makers are regularly
surveyed to verify that the
intelligence products produced for
them satisfy their needs and provide
14.4 value. 2 14 18 24 10 2.96
We evaluate our competitive
14.5 intelligence results. 2 10 15 32 15 3.22
Total Average 3.14
Section C: Organizational culture
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 Average
We have dedicated staff and
resources for the organisation of
15.1 competitive intelligence information. 2 14 18 32 0 2.87
Our employees actively seek out
information to respond quickly to
15.2 customers and partners? 0 12 21 32 10 3.26
Our employees take self initiative to
improve the company's overall
15.3 performance. 0 2 18 52 15 3.78
Our employees perceive themselves
as part of the organization's decision-
15.4 making body. 2 2 30 32 10 3.30
Total Average 3.29
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16: Human resources orientation
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 Average
Most employees understand exactly
16.1 what competitive intelligence is. 3 18 15 20 5 2.65
We make intelligence training
16.2 available to all our employees. 2 30 9 12 0 2.30
Every employee is given
16.3 counterintelligence training. 4 22 12 16 0 2.35
Our employees are aware of the
competitive intelligence methods
16.4 used by our competitors. 1 18 18 20 10 2.91
Our employees understand clearly
that our proprietary information and
intellectual property should not be
disclosed, and what to do if they
become aware of potential
16.5 inappropriate disclosure or access. 2 12 18 32 5 3.00
Total Average 2.64
17: Organization focus
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 Average
Our company recognises Cl as a
legitimate and necessary activity for
17.1 business. 0 0 21 44 25 3.91
Our organizational culture
17.2 encourages information sharing. 0 8 27 32 10 3.35
Our company encourage openness in
17.3 using information. 0 4 9 64 10 3.78
Information on company
performance presented to employees
continuously to improve their
17.4 effectiveness. 1 8 12 48 10 3.43
Our intelligence activities have a
great support from the senior
17.5 company management. 0 4 12 56 15 3.78
Total Average 3.64
18: Communication flow
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 Average
Our employees do not frequently
18.1 keep information to themselves. 2 6 27 32 5 3.13
We don't have lack of
18.2 communication between departments. 0 4 6 60 20 3.91
We have internal publications (print
media) to encourage our employees
18.3 exchange information. 4 22 21 0 5 2.26
We have internal electronic platform
(intranet) to encourage our
18.4 employees exchan_ge information. 6 24 6 8 5 2.13
en
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19: Reward
Our employees share information
within teams, across functions and
with customers and suppliers, as
18.5 appropriate. 1 12 12 40 10 3.26
Total Average 2.94
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 Average
Employees encouraged expressing
19.1 their information needs. 0 2 12 48 30 4.00
Our company has incentives to
encourage employees to report their
competitive observations and
19.2 information. 1 18 18 28 0 2.83
Total Average 3.41
20: Trust
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 Average
Our employees trust one another to
share information about process or
20.1 product failure? 0 4 9 68 5 3.74
Our employees trust the company's
database and formal resources of
20.2 information. 0 6 9 56 15 3.74
Total Average 3.74
Section D: Percentage of allocation of time in all sectors
21 breakdown of the percentage of "intelligence" time in the process
of competitive intelligence Percent
21.1 Planning and Focus 28%
21.2 Gathering the information 33%
21.3 Analysing the information 22%
21.4 Communicating the intelligence
17%
22 percentage of "intelligence time" spent on the following targets
Percent
22.1
competitors 22%
22.2
customers 38%
22.3 Government Institutions 16%
22.4 Suppliers 19%
22.5 Partners 10%
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I thank you for your time and effort to complete this questionnaire
23 Percentage of information you get from each of the following Percent
sources
23.1
people inside an organization
40%
23.2
people outside an organization
31%
23.3
electronic information
12%
23.4
published information
19%
23.5
other
3%
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